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GROUP RIGHTS IN CULTURAL PROPERTY:
JUSTIFYING STRICT INALIENABILITY
The Greek historian Polybius must have been a man of great
foresight, for it was he who first called for the protection of a cul-
ture's art from foreign claim or seizure.' True to Polybius's fears,
states including his own native Greece have been dispossessed of
some of their greatest cultural and artistic patrimony.2 Though to-
day the multilateral United Nations Economic, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
I See Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 831, 833 n.9 (1986). The Son of Lycortas, Polybius was a Megalopolitan-born his-
torian who lived from around 210 B.C. to 128 B.C. 4 A. HOLM, HISTORY OF GREECE
514-16 (1898).
2 See C. BRACKEN, ANTIQUrIIES ACQUIRED (1975) (comprehensively chronicling the
spoilation of Greece). One need only think of the Parthenon Marbles held in the British
Museum (see infra notes 71-94 and accompanying text); the Kanakaria Mosaics, which a
United States District Court recently ordered returned to Cyprus (see Autocephalous
Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus, et al. v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., et al.,
C.A. No. 89-304-C (S.D. Ind. 1989) (memorandum of decision and order)); the Venus
de Milo kept at the Louvre; and the altar of Pergamum, now in Berlin, among others.
Those in whose best interests it has been to suggest that the Greeks are, or at least
were, incompetent to care for their artistic treasures have argued that retention of plun-
dered art is justified because such art belongs to the "common heritage of mankind." In
fact, the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property adopted this universalist ap-
proach. See The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (1956). These self-interested reten-
tionists-including art dealers and museums in economically-rich states-justify reluc-
tance to repatriate illicitly acquired art by resort to the rhetoric of cultural universalism:
"We deplore all destruction in situ, most of it caused by the indifference of the very
people whose past is involved." Letter to the Editor, Bernard V. Bothmer, The N.Y.
Times, Oct. 19, 1982, at A30 col. 5; "To rip the Elgin Marbles from the walls of the
British Museum is a much greater disaster than the threat of blowing up the Parthenon."
C. HrrCHENS, THE ELGIN MARBLES 98 (1987) (quoting British Museum Director Sir
David Wilson); "All Greeks were peasants. They did not deserve such wonderful works
of antiquity .... T. VRErros, THE SHADOW OF MAGNITUDE: THE ACQuIsrrION OF THE
ELGIN MARBLES 82 (1974) (quoting Lord Elgin's response to being told by the British
Counsul that certain takings of Eleusian statuary were illegal); "[T]he moral order dic-
tates that Britain should keep the Elgin Marbles because Britain is the 'true heir of Peri-
cles' democracy.'" C. HrrCHENS, supra, at 26 (quoting recent statement of Roger
Scranton, publisher of the Salisbury Review).
The Greeks, however, have had a rich history of concern for artistic treasures begin-
ning with Polybius and continuing through current efforts to regain possession of the
Parthenon Marbles. For example, in 1822 John Coletis, Minister of War in the Greek
revolutionary government, requested French philhellenes aiding the revolution to assist
in the preservation of antiquities, particularly the Parthenon. Id. at 24. At the same
time, when the Turkish garrison stationed atop the Acropolis began to break the Parthe-
non's surviving walls to get at the lead shielding of the clamps and melt it down for
bullets, the Greek besiegers offered their opponents bullets if they would leave the Par-
thenon undamaged. Referring to this offer, distinguished archaeologist A. Rizos Ran-
gavis wrote: "Those who in the old days fed their starving enemies performed an act of
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Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property ("UNESCO Convention") 3 nominally protects
cultural property,4 the modem world has not yet truly heeded Po-
philanthropy, but no nobler action in time of war than this, worthy of highest civiliza-
tion, can ever be undertaken." Id.
Indeed, this concern for the preservation of Greek treasures in general, and the
Acropolis in particular, was evidenced by some of the earliest laws of the newly in-
dependent state.
[O]ne of the first acts of the nearly independent Greek state, in the
1830s, was restoration of the Acropolis buildings to free them from the
accretions of Turkish and Frankish occupation. The law passed in 1834
to protect antiquities and monuments expressed the view that 'all objects
of antiquity in Greece, as the productions of the ancestors of the Hellenic
people, are regarded as the common national possession of all Hellenes.'
I. McBryde, Introduction, in WHO OWNS THE PAST 5 (I. McBryde ed. 1985).
In addition, at the Greek Archaeological Society's founding, held upon the ruins of
the Parthenon in 1837, the society's first president pointed to the crumbling buildings
and said: "These stones are more precious than rubies or agates. It is to these stones
that we owe our rebirth as a nation." C. HrrCHENS, supra, at 25.
Finally, General Makriyannis, hero of the Greek Revolution and popular writer, yet
virtually illiterate, discovered that some of his soldiers were thinking of selling the statu-
ary to two European travellers at Argos. In Makriyannis words: "I took the soldiers
aside and spoke to them: 'even if they give you ten thousand gold coins for these things,
do not deign to let them leave our country. This is what we fought for.'" ANDRONICOS,
THE GREEK MUSEUMS 9 (1975).
For a discussion of the tension between universalist and nationalist, or group-based,
claims, see infra notes 173-91 and accompanying text.
The plunder of artistic heritage is hardly limited to Greece. Indeed, it has reached
unprecedented levels in Latin America. See, e.g., Coggins, Illicit Traffic of Pre-Columbian
Antiquities, 29 ARTJ. 94, 94 (1969) ("Not since the sixteenth century has Latin America
been so ruthlessly plundered."). See also Note, Enforcing Foreign Ownership Claims in the
Antiquities Market, 97 YALE L.J. 466, 468-71 (1988) (authored by Jonathan S. Moore).
3 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Im-
port, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 4, 1970, 823
U.N.T.S. 231 (1972), reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 289 (1971) [hereinafter
UNESCO Convention]. The 1983 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation
Act [hereinafter CPIA] implements the UNESCO Convention into American law. 19
U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2613 (West Supp. 1989).
4 The UNESCO Convention defines cultural property as: a) rare collections and
specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and objects of palaenotological inter-
est; b) property relating to history, ranging from the history of science, technology, mili-
tary, social history, to the life of national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artists and to
events of national importance; c) products of archaeological excavations or discoveries;
d) elements of artistic or historical monuments, or dismembered archaeological sites; e)
antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins, and engraved
seals; f) objects of ethnological interest; g) property of artistic interest, such as (i) pic-
tures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on any support and in any
material (excluding industrial designs and manufactured articles decorated by hand); (ii)
original works of statuary art and sculpture in any material; (iii) original engravings,
prints and lithographs; and (iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any mate-
rial; h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and publications of spe-
cial interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.), singly or in collections; i)
postage, revenue or similar stamps, singly or in collections;j) archives, including sound,
photographic, and cinematographic archives; k) articles of furniture more than one hun-
dred years old, and old musical instruments. UNESCO Convention at art. 1.
The CPIA protects a narrower subset of materials--only the import of archaeologi-
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lybius's call.5
cal or ethnological materials, in danger of being lost to pillage, is prohibited if, and
when, the President agrees to restrict import of such items pursuant to a formal request
by a nation shown to vigorously protect its own items of cultural importance. See USIA,
Curbing Illicit Trade in Cultural Property: U.S. Assistance Under the Convention on Cultural Prop-
erty Implementation Act 1 (April 1989) [hereinafter Curbing Illicit Trade]. Archaeological
material must be of cultural significance, at least 250 years old, and normally discovered
as a result of scientific excavation, clandestine or accidental digging, or exploration on
land or under water. Id. at 22. Ethnological materials must be: "the product of a tribal
or nonindustrial society; at least 50 years old; and, important to the cultural heritage of a
people because of its distinctive characteristics, comparative rarity, or its contribution to
the knowledge of the origins, development, or history of the people." Id.
The import of stolen cultural property (apparently not limited to archaeological or
ethnological materials) taken from a museum, church, or secular public monument also
is prohibited by the CPIA. Id. at 34; see 19 U.S.C.A. § 2607 (West Supp.1989).
5 Unfortunately, the political compromises struck during the eleven year period
preceding the formulation of enabling legislation for the UNESCO Convention created
shortcomings which substantially diminish the CPIA's role in arresting the pillage of
cultural patrimony. See, e.g., Hofkin, The Cultural Property Act: The Art of Compromise, 12
COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 423, 442 (1988) (lamenting the overaccommodation of the art
lobby's interests in the legislation's final draft); Partington & Sage, The American Response
to the Recovery of Illegally Exported Art: Should the American Courts Look to Civil Law?, 12
CoLuM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 395, 397 (accusing the United States of failing to implement
legislation favorable to art-rich nations' interests in retaining their cultural property, and
thereby failing to halt illicit art trafficking). See alsoJ. Moustakas, The Kanakaria Mosaics
and the International Protection of Cultural Property: Shortcomings in the American
Implementation of the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Prevent-
ing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (July 14,
1989) (on file with the Cornell Law Review).
Aside from the inadequacy of the American response to Polybius's ancient heed,
other states similarly have failed to assure the protection of cultural property. First,
many of the most significant art-importing nations-for example, France, Japan, Swit-
zerland, West Germany, and the United Kingdom-have not signed the UNESCO Con-
vention. See Letter from Somar Wijayadasa, UNESCO official, to John Moustakas (June
20, 1989) (listing the Convention's signatories) (on file with the Cornell Law Review).
The failure of such nations to accede to the UNESCO Convention also is significant for
its impact on American protection of cultural property. Because the CPIA permits the
President to impose import restrictions on foreign cultural property only when such
restrictions would be of substantial benefit in deterring pillage, the free commerce in art
in the other major art-consuming states often will prevent the President from imposing
restrictions because American controls alone may not substantially deter pillage. Sec-
ond, "a tragic combination of artistic sophistication and an imperialistic attitude," par-
ticularly in the West, conspires to encourage the looting of cultural property by creating
a voracious appetite for foreign works. See Note, supra note 2, at 468. Third, art-rich
nations themselves, are under enormous pressures created by the market demand for
their art which makes the prevention of looting nearly impossible. Smuggling nationals,
particularly in underdeveloped nations, often are willing to sacrifice cultural heritage for
an improved standard of living. See L. DUBOFF, THE DESKBOOK OF ART Law 71 (1977).
Cf Merryman, The Retention of Cultural Property, 21 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 477, 487 (1988)
("The political problem is that citizens in the source nation are likely to oppose imple-
mentation of [national ownership] legislation unless unusually generous compensation
is provided."). In addition, other domestic priorities in many of these nations simply
make it impossible to police all archaeological sites. See Bator, An Essay on the Interna-
tional Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275, 289-94 (1982); Note, supra note 2, at 470 n.21
and accompanying text. Fourth, given these supply-side difficulties in arresting the illicit
trade in art, many art-rich nations have focused on demand-side techniques. The most
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Notwithstanding states' reliance on such multilateral provisions
establishing rights for the restitution or protection of cultural prop-
erty, the looting and pillage of cultural heritage continues whole-
sale. 6 The thriving black market in art treasures is only surpassed by
the illicit international drug trade. 7 The non-participation in the
UNESCO Convention by most art-importing states, and the diluted
adherence and implementation of UNESCO in other states both ex-
plain this continued crisis. 8
As states rely on traditional means for seeking the protection of
their cultural property, so too does the scholarship in this field focus
on traditional and technical issues of compliance with multilateral
provisions, 9 jurisdiction and choice-of-law, ° and enforcement. 1
Comfortable with its old vocabulary, this scholarship continues to
struggle to reconcile emerging notion5 of national cultural identity
popular among these is the umbrella ownership statute, pursuant to which a state de-
clares all antiquities of a specified age, whether above or below the ground, owned by
the state, thus making export technically illegal. See generally Note, supra note 2 (advocat-
ing the enforcement of some umbrella ownership statutes by importing nations). Unfor-
tunately, importing nations generally have refused to enforce such export controls by
imposing their own import restrictions. Id. at 470 n.24 and accompanying text. See
Kenety, Who Owns the Past? The Need for Legal Reform and Reciprocity in the International Art
Trade, CORNELL INT'L LJ. (forthcoming); Rogers, The Legal Response to the Illicit Movement
of Cultural Property, 5 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 932, 934-35 (1973).
6 See Hofkin, supra note 5, at 426; Partington & Sage, supra note 5, 396-97; Note,
supra note 2, at 468-71.
7 Nafziger, International Penal Aspects of Protecting Cultural Property, 19 INr'L L. 835
(1985).
8 See supra note 5.
9 See, e.g., Bolla, Keynote Address: The UNESCO Convention on Illicit Traffic of
Art, reprinted in 15 N.Y.UJ. INT'L L. & POL. 765 (1983); see also Rogers, supra note 5.
10 See, e.g., Note, Toward Establishing an International Tribunal for the Settlement of Cul-
tural Property Disputes: How to Keep Greece From Losing its Marbles, 72 GEO. L.J. 1155 (1985)
(authored by Ann P. Prunty) [hereinafter International Tribunal]. See also Attorney-Gen-
eral v. Ortiz, [1983] 2 W.L.R. 809 (H.L. 1983) (House of Lords) (Great Britain denied
jurisdiction over a Maori carving illegally exported from New Zealand), aJfg. [19821 Q.B.
349 (C.A.); Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982)
(applying New York law, which prevents a thief from passing good title, to hold that
priceless Durer paintings, stolen from a German castle during World War II, belonged
to an East German museum); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus, et al.
v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 89-304-C (S.D. Ind. 1989) (apply-
ing Indiana law on good faith purchase); Recent Developments-Property Law: International
Stolen Art, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 466 (1983); Note, International Law in Domestic Forums: The
State of the Art, 9 BROOKLYNJ. INT'L L. 179 (1983) (authored by Helen L. Ostenberg).
11 See, e.g., Note, The Continuing Development of United States Policy Concerning the Inter-
national Movement of Cultural Property, 4 DICK. J. INT'L L. 89, 96-117 (1985) (authored by
LawrenceJ. Persick) (discussing various methods of protecting cultural heritage includ-
ing bilateral agreements, civil suits, export and import restrictions); Merryman & Elsen,
Hot Art: Reexamination of the Illegal Trade in Cultural Objects, 12 J. ARTS MGMT. & L. 15
(1982); Fitzpatrick, A Wayward Course: The Lawless Customs Policy Toward Cultural Properties,
15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 857 (1983); International Tribunal, supra note 10, at 1158
(proposing "the establishment of an international tribunal to settle disputes arising out
of transfers of cultural property").
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with rigid and sedentary classifications of property ownership. 12 In-
stead of reconciliation, the tension between theoretical and political
notions of national dignity and consciousness of common group
12 For example, respected art law professorJohn Merryman confesses his confusion
over the fact that poor countries, whose "development policies normally encourage ex-
port trade to earn foreign exchange to pay for imports and to finance domestic growth,"
treat cultural property as an exception to that rule. Despite a well-funded market for
such objects abroad, he believes that export trade in cultural artifacts is severely circum-
scribed in many of those countries by cultural property retention schemes. See Mer-
ryman, supra note 5, at 479. Professor Merryman characterizes many of these retention
schemes as animated by "an unsophisticated form of market aversion." Id. at 481 n.12.
Indeed, he holds flatly that cultural property is merely another product in the market,
and that economic considerations legitimately should apply to it as they do to fungible
goods. l at 500.
It is from this proposition that this entire Note establishes its critique of the tradi-
tional treatment of cultural property, arguing contrarily that the marketplace is a flawed
device for the distribution and disposition of some types of cultural property. See infra
notes 44-59 and accompanying text. Cultural property particularly touching group
rights, for example, should often merit special, nonmarket treatment-namely, strict in-
alienability. See infra notes 95-116 and accompanying text. Rejection of the market for
the purpose of determining rights in cultural property is based upon several principles:
First, a market analysis is necessarily incomplete because the market fails to value the
interests of future generations precisely because they have no impact on the market. See
infra notes 107, 114 & 132-38 and accompanying text. Second, subjecting property so
closely associated with a group's identity to market rhetoric and processes demeans both
the property and the related identity or group image. See infra notes 107-10 and accom-
panying text. Third, the market is unfair to the extent it subjects lesser developed states,
or groups, to the unhappy choice of retaining cultural property in the marketplace at the
expense of equally fundamental expenditures on education, health care, housing, and
welfare. Cf infra note 164.
Unfortunately, however, our traditional understanding of property rights creates
substantial hurdles which threaten such special treatment. First, the scholarship as-
sumes as a first principle the free alienability of cultural property. See infra notes 13 & 96
and accompanying text. Cf Partington & Sage, supra note 5, at 397 (one factor explain-
ing the United States' resistance to implementing legislation favorable to art-rich na-
tions seeking to retain their treasures is an "attitude that government control over the
alienation of personal property is inimical to a free enterprise system."). Second, the
individual, and not the group (especially one whose full membership is perpetually par-
tially unascertained), is ordinarily conceived of as the holder of property rights. At very
best, when group rights are recognized, they are generally thought to be derivative of
individual rights. See infra notes 44-62 and accompanying text. Third, transferability is
presumed an essential incident of ownership. See L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHrs: PHILO-
soPHIc FOUNDATIONS 18 (1977) (notions of full ownership traditionally include the right
to possess, use, manage, receive income, retain immunity from expropriation, transmit,
and alienate). See also Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NoMos XXII 69 (J.
Pennock & W. Chapman eds. 1980) ("To own property is to have exclusive control of
something-to be able to use it as one wishes, to sell it, to give it away, leave it idle, or
destroy it. Legal restraints on the free use of one's property are conceived of as depar-
tures from an ideal concept of full ownership."). But cf Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51
(1978) (destruction of one "strand" of "bundle of rights" in property does not consti-
tute a taking).
In addition, the view that art is legitimately the common heritage of all mankind
creates another hurdle to affording particular groups special rights in cultural property.
Once again, this hurdle is described by the dialectic between cultural universalism and
cultural nationalism. See supra note 2 and infra notes 173-91 and accompanying text.
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past, both of which are linked to the retention of cultural objects for
the purpose of nation-building, and practical conceptions of prop-
erty ownership, promise an inevitable collision.
Both scholarship and cultural property retention schemes
aware of these tensions fail to avert the imminent collision between
theory and practice because they unquestioningly defer to outmo-
ded conceptions of ownership. t 3 Even the UNESCO approach, for
all its lofty references to cultural property as "one of the basic ele-
ments of civilization and national culture,"' 4 impliedly adopts this
unimaginative vision of property rights. By purporting to prohibit
"illicit" transfers of cultural property, the Convention implies the
existence of "licit" transfers beyond UNESCO's grasp. Presumably,
given UNESCO's thematic emphasis against the evils of involuntary
dispossession of cultural property, all voluntary transfers, sanc-
tioned by some authority, would pass muster as "licit" transfers.
This Note argues that neither UNESCO's emphasis on "illicit"
transfets, nor national laws' self-imposed restraints on the alienabil-
ity of cultural property15 should imply the contrary power-that
some authority always exists empowered to direct the dispossession
of a state's cultural heritage. To the contrary, this Note argues that
protecting certain types of cultural property ought to be mandatory,
transcending the authority of national law to do otherwise.
Because "cultural objects nourish a sense of community, of par-
ticipation in a common human enterprise,"' 6 this Note focuses on
the propinquity of cultural property to group, culture, or nation.
The nexus between a cultural object and a group is the essential
measurement for determining whether group rights in cultural
property will be effectuated to the fullest extent possible-by hold-
ing such objects strictly inalienable from the group. Clearly, such
potent protection should not apply to fungible property, but only to
that property bearing substantial earmarks of relatedness to the rel-
evant group. Objects bearing such earmarks are "property for
grouphood." An object qualifies as property for grouphood when
(1) it is substantially "bound up" with group identity, and (2) its
retention does not constitute "bad object relations."' 7 Such a test
13 See Merryman, supra note 5, at 482 n.14. See also supra note 12.
14 See UNESCO Convention, supra note 3, at preamble.
15 "Whatever the motivation for a national law attempting to prevent the export of
cultural objects may be, however unreasonable such a retention may seem, it is undenia-
bly within the power of the nation to enact and attempt to enforce such laws." Mer-
ryman, International Art Law: From Cultural Nationalism to a Common Cultural Heritage, 15
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 757 (1983).
16 Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339, 349 (1989)
(citations omitted).
17 This test is analogized from Professor Radin's "property for personhood" test.
See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text. These factors are more fully explained
1184 [Vol. 74:1179
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could be useful for deciding which export restrictions promulgated
by foreign nations should be respected. Thus, while all foreign "na-
tional ownership" claims need not be accepted, those applying to
property for grouphood should be respected by the imposition of
reciprocal import restrictions.
By distinguishing fungible goods from property for grouphood,
this Note demonstrates that the latter category warrants broader
protection. The notion that groups have intrinsic rights to exist, de-
velop, flourish, and perpetuate themselves, and that these rights
often are intertwined with groups' relations to history and objects,
justifies both creating a category of property which promotes
grouphood and distinguishing between that property and merely
fungible property. By recognizing that groups have rights in some
cultural property, the Note argues that a law and economics per-
spective18 risks offending group identities by its willingness to com-
promise constitutive incidents of "grouphood" in the market under
the guise of "mov[ing cultural objects] to the locus of highest prob-
able protection"19 just as such a perspective offends the concept of
personhood when it calls for complete commodification.20 None-
theless, this Note even argues that economic efficiency, too, should
often require recognizing the special nature of property for
grouphood.
Once cultural property is found to constitute property for
grouphood, special protections should automatically apply. These
special protections would come in the form of restraints on the
alienability of property for grouphood. Restraining the alienability
of property for grouphood both promotes proper group develop-
ment and elevates, as a defense against the charge of paternalism,
the concept of "communal flourishing" as an important justification
for holding such property inalienable.2 1 To the extent that this vi-
there. Where the term property for personhood might describe property so closely
bound up with our individual identities that its loss "causes pain that cannot be relieved
by the object's replacement," Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959
(1982), property for grouphood expresses something about the entire group's relation-
ship to certain property. Some property can be essential to the preservation of group
identity and group self-esteem.
18 See generally A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMics (1983).
19 Merryman, supra note I, at 847. See also Note, supra note 11, at 95 ("[Art dealers]
generally believe that associating a dollar value with a work will enhance that work's
position in the eyes of society, insuring that it will be preserved.") (citation omitted).
20 See Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1859-70 (1987).
21 Group development is analogized from personhood development. On per-
sonhood theory, see Radin, supra note 17. From personhood emerges the concept of
"human flourishing." Objects which fulfill the requirements for categorization as prop-
erty for personhood do so because they promote human flourishing. See Radin, supra
note 20, at 1937. "To flourish is to lead the sort of life it is good to lead, by which is
meant the sort of life you want your children to lead, as well as the sort of life you want
1989] 1185
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sion of property for grouphood is developed by analogy from per-
sonhood scholarship, this Note visits those personhood analogues
to grouphood rights.22
Protecting those essential rights embodied in property for
grouphood, however, requires a regime of strict inalienability,
rather than one of mere market inalienability. 23 Because deciding
whether cultural property meets the criteria of property for
grouphood requires a case-by-case examination, this Note offers no
universally applicable test. Instead, it suggests useful factors for
measuring whether an object constitutes property for grouphood.
As a primary vehicle for exploring the contours of a theory of group
rights in cultural property, and for determining which property
qualifies as such, this Note considers a celebrated example of alien-
ated cultural property-the Parthenon Marbles. 24
In section I, this Note finds independent group rights inhering
in certain cultural property. Qualifying property is classified as
property for grouphood. Section II concludes that the Note's spe-
cific case study-the Parthenon Marbles-is an example of property
for .grouphood. This section also asks whether the Greeks, them-
selves, could voluntarily have given the Marbles away. Because of
their intrinsic link to Greek grouphood, section II concludes that the
Marbles could not have been so transferred consistent with this the-
ory of property for grouphood. Therefore, section II urges the
adoption of strict inalienability rules to protect property for
grouphood. Where early sections of the Note address traditional
property concepts' intolerance of group ownership claims, section
to lead yourself." Harman, Human Flourishing, Ethics, and Liberty, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS.
306, 311 (1983). Likewise, from group development, this Note draws the concept of
"communal flourishing" as the group analogue to human flourishing. Communal flour-
ishing represents the hoped-for outcome from a group's relationship to property for
grouphood. See infra note 106.
22 See infra notes 26-43 and accompanying text.
23 Market inalienability means that the object subject to such a regime cannot be
transferred through the market. Simply put, an object held market-inalienable is non-
salable. A holder under such a regime may give away her entitlement, but is prohibited
from selling it. See Radin, supra note 20, at 1853. Strict inalienability, on the other hand,
is a regime of complete nontransferability. Under such a regime a holder can neither
give away nor sell her entitlement. See infra notes 97-116 and accompanying text for
reasons why a regime of market inalienability is inadequate to protect cultural property
for grouphood.
24 See infra notes 71-94 and accompanying text. Although many of the sources con-
tinue to refer to them as the "Elgin Marbles," the Note calls them the "Parthenon Mar-
bles." Calling them by the former name implicitly assumes what the British conclude:
that the Marbles rightfully belong in the British Museum. Although it is beyond the
scope of this Note to explore the particularities of the Marbles' taking, it is far more
controversial than the British thus far have conceded. For a thorough discussion of the
history and legitimacy of the taking generally, see C. HITCHENS, supra note 2; Kenety,
supra note 5. For the Marbles' history, see infra note 82.
[Vol. 74:11791186
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III finally confronts the remaining tension at the heart of the way we
think about cultural property. It attempts to accommodate the fun-
damental tensions between cultural universalism's assumption that
the world's most important works of art constitute the "common
heritage of mankind" 25 and property for grouphood's requirement
that such works remain "at home."
I
PROPERTY FOR GROUPHOOD-GROUP RIGHTS INHERING IN
CULTURAL PROPERTY
A. A Brief Excursus on Property for Personhood
Because recognizing group rights is essential to this Note's ulti-
mate conclusion-that property for grouphood should be held
strictly inalienable-a vibrant conception of group rights is needed
to decide specific disputes among rival group claimants. 26 In the
absence of a well-developed group rights theory, analogy from the
richer area of personhood theory helps to establish the bounds of a
grouphood theory.
A personhood theory justifies special rules for the treatment of
property based upon the relationship of persons to objects.27 Indi-
viduals need to have some control over resources in their environ-
ment to achieve proper self-development. 28 Property rights
guarantee the necessary assurances of control to protect resources
instrumental to that goal.29 Typically, rights for the protection of
property entitlements can be characterized as either liability rules,
property rules, or inalienability rules.30 For much personal prop-
25 See generally Merryman, supra note 1.
26 A personhood perspective of property "can help decide specific disputes be-
tween rival claimants." Radin, supra note 17, at 958. Similarly, a grouphood perspective
of property will ultimately do the same among rival group claimants.
27 See generally Radin, supra note 17. See also Grey, supra note 12, at 77.
The idealist 'personality' theory rests on the . . .idea that human
beings naturally come to regard some objects as extensions of themselves
in some important sense. This idea gains its intuitive force from the way
most people regard their homes, their immediate personal effects, and
other material things that play a double role as part of their most immedi-
ate environmental in daily life and at the same time as expressions of
their personalities.
28 Radin, supra note 17, at 957.
29 Id.
30 Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that
someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy
it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitle-
ment is agreed upon by the seller .... Whenever someone may destroy
the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined
value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.... An entitle-
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erty, a property rule sufficiently protects our interest in control over
resources essential to self-constitution and self-development. 31
Such a rule prevents forced transfers, 32 but allows voluntary aliena-
tion. Sometimes, however, inalienability rules are necessary to en-
sure adequate control over property.33
Personhood theory posits a continuum between intimately per-
sonal and completely fungible property. It creates a hierarchy of
entitlements whose strength depends on the closeness of the entitle-
ment or resource to personhood.34 Property near the personal end
of this continuum "is important precisely because its holder could
not be the particular person she is without it." 35 Protecting those
things on the personal end of the continuum is the dominant con-
cern of personhood theory. To constitute property for personhood,
an object must fulfill two criteria. 36 First, the property must be suffi-
ciently "bound up" with the holder's identity or personhood. This
criterion evaluates an object's propinquity to the goal of self-consti-
tution. Second, even if the property is vital to self-constitution, it is
not personhood property if its retention promotes "bad object rela-
tions." 37 Property for personhood must pass both tests.
While self-identification through objects is relative, Radin sug-
gests that "an object is closely related to one's personhood if its loss
ment is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is not permitted between
a willing buyer and a willing seller.
Id. at 1092.
31 Radin, supra note 17, at 988. For personal property, Radin would assure that, if
essentially linked to personality, it would not be taken from us against our will.
32 Calabresi and Melamed's liability rules avoid holdout problems and transaction
costs by allowing forced entitlement shifts upon the payment of market-determined
compensation. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 30, at 1106-10. Such a rule also is
known as a "forced sale." See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 15, at 90 (5th ed. 1984).
33 "Distinguishing 'inalienability rules' from 'property rules'.., implicates the na-
ture of contract .... [T]he issue is when the law ought to disallow or void someone's
attempt to relinquish an item voluntarily ...... Radin, supra note 17, at 986 n.101.
Radin is concerned in the personhood context that inalienability might attach to inter-
ests "too close to personhood to think of as property," such as agreeing to commit
suicide. Id. Nonetheless, beyond these interests, she appears willing to support the pro-
hibition of specific transactions for the traditional reasons supporting inalienability. For
discussion of those traditional reasons, see notes 117-65 and accompanying text. For
further discussion of inalienability rules, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 30, at
1111-15 nn.42-51 and accompanying text.
34 Radin, supra note 17, at 986. For the grouphood analogue, see infra note 59 and
accompanying text.
35 Id. at 972.
36 Id. at 968-69.
37 This second criterion operates as a "sufficiently objective criteri[on] to identify
close object relations that should be excluded from recognition as personal property
because the particular nature of the relationship works to hinder rather than to support
healthy self-constitution." Id. See infra note 41 and accompanying text for an explana-
tion of bad object relations.
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causes pain that cannot be relieved by the object's replacement. 38
Radin concludes that "[a] person cannot be fully a person without a
sense of continuity of self over time."'3 9 Ongoing relationships be-
tween ourselves and both "things" and other people maintain that
sense of continuity.
40
Once property is deemed to be "bound up" with its holder's
personhood, it must meet the test's second criterion: its retention
must not promote "bad object relations." In order to make this de-
termination, personhood theory requires an examination of the dis-
tinction between good and bad object relations. Despite a claim
that some property is bound up with a person's identity, it should
not receive personhood property treatment when an objective
moral consensus would agree that being bound up with it is incom-
patible with personhood. Here, Radin leaves us with the largely in-
tuitive definition that good object relations are those that are
healthy.41 By implication, bad object relations are fetishistic. Prop-
erty, therefore, must qualify by proving that its retention promotes
good object relations or, at least, does not constitute bad object re-
lations to meet the second prong of the test for property for
personhood.
One consequence of the personhood property characterization
is that qualifying property has a stronger moral claim than other
property. The consequence of denying personhood status to prop-
erty that fails one or both prongs is to treat that property as fungi-
38 See Radin, supra note 17, at 959. For example, this view would argue that an
exact replica of the original Declaration of Independence could not compensate Ameri-
cans for the hypothetical loss of the original, actually penned by the Founders. "Most
people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves. These objects are
closely bound up with personhood because they are part of the way we constitute our-
selves as continuing personal entities in the world." Id. This Note argues that the same
is true of certain cultural property. See infra notes 56-59, 64-70, 83, 84 & 87.
39 Id at 1004.
40 Id
41 Id. at 968. Bad object relations are fetishistic, good object relations are not. So-
ciety should discourage bad object relations because "becoming too enthralled with
property takes away time and energy needed to develop other faculties constitutive of
personhood." Id.
In the grouphood context, retention of an object merely to prevent others from
possessing it is fetishistic. For example, retention of art already represented in abun-
dance in a source nation is fetishistic. See infra section III. Thus, in the example of
restrained cultural property, when objects are used to promote cultural intolerance or
unbridled ethnocentricity, or have that effect, their retention is likely to be fetishistic.
See Dummett, The Ethics of Cultural Property, ATHENA, at 318, Oct. 1986 (arguing
that anyone who relishes cultural diversity should find local patriotism endearing and its
affects admirable; "as with other loyalties, it would become malign only if it were to
engender contempt for or hatred of other localities.").
Good object relations, on the other had, are not fetishistic. They occur when the
retainers use the property to foster important values including pride, learning, and com-
munity. See infra notes 59 & 63-70 and accompanying text.
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ble.42 Property that is merely fungible does not receive any special
protections.
43
B. Analogizing Grouphood Rights in Property from
Personhood Rights in Property
As discussed above, some property aids personhood to the ex-
tent that it promotes self-development; personal property is impor-
tant precisely because its holder could not be the particular person
she is without it. Whether property similarly can aid grouphood de-
pends upon the intrinsic existence of group rights. Finding in-
dependent group rights is important because, if merely derivative of
individual or societal rights, the protection of those group rights
would be constrained. If derivative, group rights would remain
subordinated to individual or societal rights in clashes with those
rights. If group rights exist independently, however, they merit the
protections and powers afforded individuals, including in some
cases, the right to control property.
1. The Intrinsic Existence of Grouphood Rights
Despite the lack of a fully developed group rights dialogue, a
significant body of current scholarship supports a theory of in-
dependent or intrinsic group rights.44 Criticizing existing derivative
value theories for group rights (i.e., that group rights derive from
either individual, or from both individual and sociality rights), one
scholar has developed an intrinsic value theory for group rights.45
Two United States Supreme Court cases demonstrate the recogni-
42 Radin, supra note 17, at 970.
43 Indeed, a liability rule might be the only protection for some fungible property.
Under such a rule one can be dispossessed of the object and receive merely cash re-
placement rather than restoration of the object. For example, most contract rights are
only enforced by liability rules.
44 See, e.g., Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
1001, 1001-02 (1983) ("[Tlhere is an intrinsic value in groups.... To rob existence of
communality, of the communal celebratory process which forms the substance of much
or our experience, would be to deny one ethical constituent of our humanity."); Stone,
Should Trees Have Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals Reach, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 19 (1985) (discussing the value of community as surviving the lives of individu-
als); Van DykeJustice as Fairness: For Groups?, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 607, 614 (1975) ("it
is arbitrary to assume that justice is only for individuals and states"). Cf R. NISBET,
COMMUNITY AND POWER 25-26 (1962) ("In many areas of contemporary thought lie evi-
dences of a positive regard for community ... that contrasts sharply with the general
emphasis upon release and individuation ... ; plainly, the aspiration toward moral cer-
tainty and social community... gives relevance to so much of the theoretical and imagi-
native work of the age.").
45 Garet, supra note 44, at 1001. A derivative theory of group rights assumes that
any rights conferred upon groups exist as a result of group members' individual rights
or society's rights. Under such a theory, group rights merely collectively express rights
of individuals. Garet's intrinsic value theory, however, holds that groups qua groups
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tion and operation of an intrinsic value theory of group rights. A
derivative value theory of group rights cannot explain these cases
because the Court protects group rights in both cases at the expense
of both individual and societal rights. The elevation of group rights
as the ratio decidendi in these cases destroys the myth of derivative
group rights and installs in their place a system of symmetrical indi-
vidual, communal (group), and societal rights.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,46 the Supreme Court exempted children in
traditional Amish and Mennonite communities from state compul-
sory schooling after the age of fourteen. The Court reasoned that
formal schooling beyond that age would deprive the children of
their "free exercise" rights by potentially weakening those commu-
nities. Yoder is about a community striving to protect its group-
ness.47 As the Amish respondents contended in their Supreme
Court brief:
There exists no Amish religion apart from the concept of the
Amish community. A person cannot take up the Amish religion
and practice it individually. The community subsists spiritually
upon the bond of a common, lived faith sustained by common
traditions and ideals which have been revered by the whole com-
munity from generation to generation. 48
The Court's holding cannot be justified by reliance upon a deriva-
tive value theory because individual rights and societal rights
clashed with group rights; yet, group rights prevailed at the others'
expense. 4
9
Similarly, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,50 the Supreme Court
preferred group rights by deciding that the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968 did not give the federal courts jurisdiction to decide
whether a gender-discriminatory tribal membership rule deprived
an Indian woman and her children of equal protection. 51 The dis-
criminatory internal group controls at issue in Santa Clara sought to
have rights. Garet recognizes a "triple value schema" consisting of symmetrical and
independent individual, group, and societal rights. Id. at 1017.
46 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
47 Garet, supra note 44, at 1034.
48 Cover, The Supreme Court-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 29
(1983) (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 21, Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (No. 70-110)).
49 "The confinement of Yoder to individual rights is troubled by the fact that the
model of individual free exercise rights does not accommodate the control over individu-
als that must result from the grant of the exemption." Garet, supra note 44, at 1031
(emphasis in original). Nor can the result in Yoder be justified by social welfare consider-
ations, or by a societal right. See id. at 1034. This is because the social interest in com-
pulsory education and citizenship skills suffers at the hands of the Yoder outcome.
50 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
51 The rule granted tribal membership to children of male tribe members married
to female nonmembers but denied membership to children of female members married
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halt tribal dilution and mongrelization. By discriminatorily defining
tribal membership, however, the rule offended sociality by denying
a member of society the full fruits of liberty as guaranteed by the
federal constitution. Likewise, the express denial of a federal forum
to the equal protection claimants offended individual rights. A deci-
sion concerned with individual rights would have heard and upheld
the equal protection claim at issue here on the ground that the
Equal Protection Clause was meant to protect an individual's right
to be treated like those similarly situated. As in Yoder, a derivative
value theory could not justify the result in Santa Clara.52
Among other things, Santa Clara also illustrates that federal In-
dian law generally recognizes group rights. Some of those rights
may obtain in a group's relationship to property. American Indian
law has long distinguished individual from communal property. 53
Journeycake v. Cherokee Nation54 emphasizes the nature of communal
rights:
The distinctive characteristic of [tribal] property is that every
member of the community is an owner of it as such. He does not
take as an heir, or purchaser, or grantee; if he dies his right of
property does not descend; if he removes from the community it
expires; if he wishes to dispose of it he has nothing which he can
convey; and yet he has a right of property in the lands, as perfect
as that of any other person; and his children after him will enjoy
all that he enjoyed, not as heirs but as communal owners.55
2. Group Rights in Cultural Property
Having made out a prima facie case for the existence of in-
dependent group rights, we next ask whether the goal of proper
group development adequately justifies group control over certain
resources, just as the goal of proper self-development justified simi-
lar controls under personhood theory.56 American Indian law ap-
pears willing to validate this goal by recognizing group rights in
to male nonmembers. Upon tribal membership hinged property distribution rights and
other entitlements.
52 "[B]ecause there are certain things only groups, and not individuals, can have-
such as socialization processes (Yoder) and kinship stuctures (Santa Clara)-there are a
fortiori certain things that only a group can hold a right to have." Garet, supra note 44, at
1038 (emphasis in original).
53 See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, ch. 9 (1982). See also
Echo-Hawk, Museum Rights v. Indian Rights: Guidelines for Assessing Legal Interests in Native
Cultural Resources, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 437, 442 (1986) (claiming that in
federal Indian law, courts long have distinguished individual Indian property from com-
munal Indian property in which individual tribal members have no title).
54 28 Ct. Cl. 281 (1893), aft'd, 155 U.S. 196 (1894), quoted in Echo-Hawk, supra note
53, at 442.
55 Journeycake, 28 Ct. Cl. 281, 302 (1893), aft'd, 155 U.S. 196 (1894).
56 Cf supra text accompanying note 28.
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property. In addition, historic preservation law is essentially com-
munitarian to the extent that it, too, recognizes group interests in
property for the purposes of developing a sense of community. 57
Thus, the law on many occasions acknowledges that groups have
legitimate rights to "foster, strengthen, and enrich their members'
sense of community" by preserving and providing access to a com-
mon cultural heritage.58
Moreover, if one accepts the notion of independent group
rights, Radin's personhood theory allows an analogy from per-
sonhood rights in personal property to group rights in uniquely col-
lective property. Thus, by analogy, an object could qualify as
property for grouphood if it is bound up with group identity and its
retention does not constitute bad object relations. Again, if both
prongs are met, the group should retain special rights in the prop-
erty for purposes of group development, constitution, sense of com-
munity, and identity.5
9
a. Defining group scope.
This Note must offer a definition of group scope because
grouphood is the source of rights under this theory. A group is
more than a mere collection of individuals. Groups have been char-
acterized as both entities that have "a distinct existence apart from
[their] members," and ones recognized by a condition of interde-
pendence where the "identity and well-being of the members and
the group are linked. ' ' 60 "Members of the group identify them-
57 Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation,
33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 534 (1981). According to Rose, the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896) (finding that condemna-
tion of the Gettysburg battlefield fulfilled the public purpose requirement because "[i]t
would be a great object lesson to all who looked upon the land thus cared for, and it
would show a proper recognition of the great things that were done there on those
momentous days."), strikingly illustrates two critical elements. First, it illustrates that
preservation can have the political purpose of fostering a sense of community. Second,
that a "place can convey this sense of community, or more generally, that visual sur-
roundings work a political effect on our consciousness." (emphasis in original). Rose,
supra, at 483. Compare the Court's quoted language above with Pericles' funeral oration,
cited infra note 89.
58 Bator, supra note 5, at 305.
59 Like property near the personal end of the personhood continuum, see supra
note 34 and accompanying text, property near the grouphood end of the analogous
continuum would be equally essential because a group could not be what it is without
the particular property. See, e.g., Smith, Art Object and Historic Usage, in WHo OWNS THE
PAST?, supra note 2, at 87 ("The ways in which people view their past are to a considera-
ble extent reflected in those objects they choose to preserve as reminders of them-
selves."); Note, supra note 11, at 92 ("Certain objects tell people who they are and what
they have in common; a cultural heritage helps to develop and satisfy a people's need for
identity.").
60 Fiss, Groups and The Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 148 (1976).
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selves-explain who they are-by reference to their membership in
the group; and their well-being or status is in part determined by the
well-being or status of the group."
61
Groupness is relative because it depends upon comparison to
the entity of which it is a subset. For example, Christians might
comprise a group within the universe of all people, while Methodists
are a group within the universe of Christians. Due to the relativity
of groupness, in this example Christians can be both a group and a
defining universe (or society).
Likewise, while Greeks clearly comprise a society themselves,
no doubt composed of smaller groups, they are still very much a
group in the world society. Because the restitution, disposition, and
distribution of cultural property is an issue of international scope,
the contours of the group right merit choosing the world society as
the relevant universe from which to extrapolate Greek groupness. 62
Greeks, then, merely comprise one group in a world society of rival
claimants seeking to enforce, or at least discuss, rights and aims re-
lated to cultural property.
Group scope eludes precise definition, even in a specific case.
Attempts to pinpoint entire group membership invariably raise
questions. Does the community determine its members?; or, does
the individual's belief or intent determine his group membership?
The unavoidable flexibility of group boundaries, however, should
not dissuade discussion of grouphood. In our case, it is difficult to
argue that today's Greeks are not sufficiently related to the Greeks
61 Id.
62 More technically, the Greeks were merely one group within the multiethnic Otto-
man Empire when the Marbles were removed. Not only are today's Greeks a group, but
they share group membership with Pericles (strategos of Athens from 443-429 B.C.,
famous for his remarkable public works which included the Parthenon) and Phidias
(among Athens's greatest artists, he designed and supervised the construction of the
Parthenon Marbles).
Although still resurrected from time to time, the "Fallmerayer theory" (arguing that
today's Greeks are not the biological descendants of the ancient Greeks) is criticized
nowadays. See, e.g., S. SALAMONE, HELLENIC NATIONALISM AND GRAECO-TURKISH HISTo-
RIOGRAPHY: TOWARDS A THEORY OF CULTURAL SCHISMo-GENEsIS 24-31 (1981) (describ-
ing Fallmerayer's theory as an "outdated racialist approach to the problem of legitimate
cultural continuity."). See also Dummett, supra note 41, at 319 ("Greek culture has natu-
rally undergone much transformation in the course of its long history, and many influ-
ences have borne upon it; but it has been a continuous process, in which the Greek
people has retained its identity, unlike many ancient peoples which have long van-
ished."). Linguistic continuity is an earmark of group continuity, as is historic con-
tinuity: "The Greeks... have an intense sense of heritage, of historical continuity from
the Mycenaen past to the present." McBryde, supra note 2, at 4; see also A. TOYNBEE, THE
GREEKS AND THEIR HERrrAGES 273 (1981) ("There has been no break in literacy in sub-
sequent Greek history since the Hellenic Greeks' adoption of the Phoenician
alphabet.").
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of classical antiquity to possess rights to any cultural property in
which the ancients had claim.
b. Art as cultural property.
While the term "cultural property" is susceptible of many
meanings, this Note focuses on art as the predominant genre of cul-
tural property. Art can define groupness particularly well. It is
uniquely capable of being bound up with one's personhood. 63 Like-
wise, groups can have equally important relations to art.64 Because
"[a]rt speaks directly to the inner consciousness within which we re-
solve whether we do really feel a sense of belonging to a group or
community,"' 65 it links group members to their ancestors and heirs,
thereby both satisfying a basic need for identity and symbolizing
shared values. What some groups see as a cultural artifact, other
groups see as a living thing which enables them to achieve confi-
dence in themselves and, thus, able to imagine their future. 66
Preventing groups from controlling those resources necessary for
63 This notion is by no means new-it long has guided the doctrine of moral rights
inhering in an artist's works. Such an approach, in contradistinction to the approach of
this Note, elevates individual rights as the primary basis for protecting artistic integrity.
For a full discussion of the moral rights doctrine, see Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right:
A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REv. 554 (1940). See also
Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J.
COMP. L. 465, (1968).
An interesting question beyond this Note's scope is whether a moral rights analysis
could compel the Parthenon Marbles' return to Greece on the basis of an artist's rights
in the integrity of his work, i.e., his right to prevent dismemberment (see discussion of
the Bernard Buffet case infra note 94). See Geller, Comments on Possible U.S. Compliance with
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, 10 CoLuM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 665, 669 n.19 (1986) (ar-
guing that such an "integrity right may be invoked in the public interest even centuries
after an [artist's] death; 'this by parties who are in no way his heirs but who merely
possess standing to speak in the names of [a particular] culture and the integrity of its
works.").
Under an American approach toward moral rights protection, use of section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), to permit standing for parties other than
the artist to sue for misdesignation or distortion of artistic or intellectual property, has
met less certain results. See Geller, supra, at 679-80 n.67. For further discussion of the
American approach, see Hatch, Better Late Than Never: Implementation of the 1886 Berne
Convention, 22 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 171 (1989).
64 While it is through memory that we possess direct access to a personal past,
"traditions are normally perceived as corporate and integrated structures, so that claims
on a traditional past are rarely made by individuals." Smith, supra note 59, at 79.
65 Bator, supra note 5, at 305. "The existence and awareness of a common artistic
heritage can make a powerful contribution to the consciousness of the relationship be-
tween self and community." Id.
66 J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAw, ETmiCS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 54 (1987). This
view parallels the relativity of attitudes towards particular property that Radin describes
in her personhood discussion. "The same claim can change from fungible to personal
depending on who holds it. The wedding ring is fungible to the artisan who made it and
now holds it for exchange. .. "; yet, it becomes personal to the bride thereafter. Radin,
supra note 17, at 987.
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group constitution threatens group existence.67
The absence of works representing an "irreplaceable cultural
heritage" is psychologically intolerable. 68 Just as the destruction of
the Statue of Liberty would diminish the bond between immigrants
who shared the same first glimpse of the United States, or the top-
pling of Jerusalem's Wailing Wall would wound the spirit of world
Jewry, Lord Elgin's removal of the Parthenon Marbles injures Greek
groupness by having emasculated the greatest of all Greek art-the
Parthenon. By destroying the Greeks' mana, 69 the embodiment of
their highest humanistic hopes and a measure of their existence,
Lord Elgin harmed Greek grouphood by irreparably diminishing an
integral part of the celebration 70 of "being Greek."
C. Weighing the Factors that Qualify the Parthenon Marbles
as Property for Grouphood
Once again, cultural objects qualify as property for grouphood
(1) if they are bound up with a group's identity, and (2) if their re-
tention does not constitute bad object relations. Any determination
of whether property rises to the level of property for grouphood
must necessarily be reached case-by-case. Both whether property is
sufficiently bound up with holder identity and whether its retention
is fetishistic depend upon the surrounding circumstances. This
Note suggests that the Parthenon Marbles qualify as property for
grouphood and uses that example to illustrate the relevant factors
for making such a determination.
67 The fate of Alfred Rosenberg illustrates the seriousness with which the world
views violations against groups and their cultural property. As head of Nazi Germany's
Center for Nationalist Socialist Ideological and Educational Research, Rosenberg was
found responsible for a system of "organized plunder of both private and public prop-
erty throughout the invaded countries of Europe." As of July 14, 1944, more than
21,903 art objects had been seized by his organization. For these offenses against cul-
tural property, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg sentenced Rosenberg
to death. See Merryman, supra note 1, at 835-36 (citing 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 539 (1948)).
68 Browning, The Case for the Return of the Parthenon Marbles, 36 MUSEUM 38 (1984)
(quoting the Director-General of UNESCO), reprinted in J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra
note 66, at 135.
69 [I]f art gives an aura of prestige to a city or a dynasty, rival cities or rival
dynasties, which set out to conquer and humble them, will seek also to
destroy their "myth" by depriving them of this aura and appropriating it
to themselves, like cannibals who, by devouring parts of their enemies,
think to acquire their mana, the intangible source of their strength.
H. TREVOR-ROPER, THE PLUNDER OF THE ARTS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 7-8 (1970),
reprinted in J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 66, at 3-4.
70 Garet uses the term "communality" instead of grouphood. He views communal-
ity (my grouphood) as an intrinsic structure of existence along with individuality and
sociality. Garet, supra note 44, at 1015. With each of these structures he associates a
characterizing emotion: for individuality, dread; for sociality, hope; and for communal-
ity, celebration. Id. at 1072.
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The Marbles which Elgin removed actually comprise three dis-
tinct categories of incorporated art of the Parthenon: the metopes,
the frieze, and the pedimental sculpture. 71 Most of the reasons
which justify finding that the Marbles are bound up in Greek
grouphood also support a claim of good object relations. While the
factors enumerated below should aid any determination of whether
an object meets property for grouphood requirements, this list is by
no means exhaustive. Indeed, in other cases other factors may be
more relevant. These factors merely suggest the contours of a the-
ory whose precise application is particularly fact-sensitive.
1. Length of Time of Ownership
Our connections to things ordinarily increase over time. The
longer we possess an object, the more precious and irreplaceable it
becomes, and the greater its possibility of becoming bound up with
our identity. The Parthenon Marbles stood as a tribute to the inge-
nuity, creativity, and virtue, first of Athenians, then of all Greeks, for
well over two thousand years before their removal by Lord Elgin.
During this period, both outsiders and the Greeks themselves came
to identify the Parthenon as the Greeks' single most important artis-
tic contribution to Western art. Given those circumstances, it is not
surprising that after two thousand years the Greeks should see the




Historic factors invariably play a special role in the Greeks' rela-
tionship to the Parthenon and its Marbles.73 As an historic monu-
ment to humanism and to glorify Athens upon its victory over
Persian forces, Pericles commissioned one of the greatest public
works known to mankind. Built upon the ruins of an earlier acropo-
lis destroyed in the first Persian War, the Parthenon crowned this
new Acropolis.7 4 As part of an aggressive public works plan initially
meant to glorify Greece's victory over barbarism, and ultimately
aimed at expressing Athens's new status in Greece as exemplar of a
71 For a comprehensive photographic and explanatory catalog of the Parthenon's
friezes, see 1-2 F. BROMMER, DER PARTHENOFRIES (1977). For a detailed description and
discussion of the Parthenon's east pediment, see E. BERGER, DIE GEBURT DER ATHENA
IM OSTGIEBEL DES PARTHENON (1974).
72 See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
73 See, e.g., Q&A: Melina Mercouri: Greece's Claim to the Elgin Marbles, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 4, 1984, at E9, col. 1 ("[W]hen we are born, they talk to us about all this
great history that makes Greekness.").
74 C. HrrCHENS, supra note 2, at 16.
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balanced and just society,75 the Marbles epitomize an historic mo-
ment.76 As specifically commemorative of a specific war effort and
general era, the Parthenon has told Greeks about their glorious
achievements in the history of the world.
Moreover, the quality of the art, itself, has significant cultural
and historic implications. The balance and symmetry of the Mar-
bles' triad of metopes, pedimental sculpture, and the frieze, and
their relationship to the Parthenon's architectural design are unpar-
alleled. 77 The masterwork of Phidias 78 and his fellow artisans won
acclaim for the Marbles as the crowning jewel of the Parthenon, and
indeed, the entire Acropolis. 79 Quite simply, Greek art and archi-
tecture culminated in the Parthenon.8" Historically, it became the
standard by which not only later Greek and Roman art, but most
later Western art (either in a spirit of emulation or rebellion) mea-
sured itself.81 The Marbles' turbulent history further attests to their
historic importance.
82
75 SeeJ. POLLrrT, ART AND EXPERIENCE IN CLASSICAL GREECE 66 (1982).
76 Hitchens suggests the parallelism between Pericles' depiction of Athenian soci-
ety with godlike qualities and the Parthenon frieze, where the visual and spiritual gap
between men and gods vanishes.
77 For a thorough examination of the Parthenon and its constitutive elements, seeJ.
POLLITT, supra note 75, at 71-93. Pollitt stresses: "The sculptures of the Parthenon were
integrally bound up with the building's form and meaning and are inseparable, in form
and execution, from its architecture." Id. at 79.
78 Phidias
was one of the greatest Athenian artists, famous especially as a sculptor,
but also as an architect and painter. He contributed, under his friend
Pericles, to the adornment of Athens . . . . He perhaps designed and
certainly supervised the construction of the frieze of the Parthenon.
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO CLASSICAL LITERATURE 321 (P. Harvey 1974).
79 In 1380, King Pedro IV of Aragon, then titular Duke of Athens, described the
Acropolis as "the richest jewel in the world." C. HITCHENS, Supra note 2, at 21.
80 Even a Roman, Plutarch, said, "[a]ll the public buildings and temples raised in
Rome from the founding of the city to the age of the caesars cannot be put in competi-
tion with the edifices erected on the Acropolis Hill during the brief administration of
Pericles." T. VRETros, supra note 2, at 75.
In a memo solicited by Parliament, the British Museum, though denying the authen-
ticity of the Marbles (an authenticity accepted by all today), "acknowledged that the
Acropolis ha[d] remained the most outstanding national monument of Greece." Id.
81 J. POLLITr, supra note 75, at 80.
82 In 1803, Lord Elgin, a British diplomat, sought and obtained a permit to ex-
amine the Parthenon and its art. At that time, Greeks still constituted an ethnic minority
within the Ottoman Empire, under which they had been politically subjugated for nearly
four hundred years. Notwithstanding the permit's limited authorization, which has been
hotly debated, Elgin removed much of the Parthenon's sculpture. Ultimately, after a
temporary detention in Pireaus harbor by the Turks, elicited by the French who sought
the Marbles for themselves, Elgin sailed to England with the handsome booty in his
ship's hold. Subsequently, the British Parliament, by a 83-30 vote, purchased the sculp-
tures from Elgin. Thirty dissenters questioned the propriety of Elgin's actions and
sought an amendment to hold the Marbles in trust for later return to the Greeks. The
history of the Marbles is vividly laid out in several very good sources. See C. HITCHENS,
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3. Group Identity and Continuity
The universal admiration for the Parthenon engenders rever-
ence and pride which are instrumental to Greek communal flourish-
ing.8 3 The Parthenon unifies current Greeks with their ancestors
and additionally binds them to future, unborn Greeks.8 4 The sculp-
supra note 2; Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1881 (1985);
W. ST. CLAIR, LORD ELGIN AND THE MARBLES (1983); and T. VRETrOS, supra note 2.
Since the achievement of Greek independence in 1821, many have called for the
restitution of the Marbles. The Greek minister in London in 1898, Ioannes Gennadios,
asked that the fragments be returned. Merryman, supra, at 1882 n.6. Lord Byron cap-
tured the public imagination with his depiction of Elgin as a "crude despoiler of Greece"
in his poetry. In Childe Harold's Pi4rimmage, Byron wrote:
But most the modern Pict's ignoble boast,
To rive what Goth, and Turk, and Time hath spared:
Cold as Crags upon his native coast,
His mind as barren and his heart as hard,
Is he whose head conceived, whose hand prepared,
Aught to displace Athena's poor remains:
Her sons, too weak the sacred shrine to guard,
Yet felt some portion of their mother's pains,
And never knew, till then, the weight of Despot's chains.
THE POETICAL WORKS OF LORD BYRON 27 (1859).
During the Second World War, Greek heroism in turning back the armies of Musso-
lini prompted a steady stream of letters in the British press suggesting the return of the
Marbles as a sign of gratitude.
That we are the grateful admirers of our Greek ally has been said
many times during these past few weeks. Cannot we do something to
prove our admiration and gratitude? I suggest we can. [Return the Mar-
bles] ... unquestionably, they belong there. The Greeks feel the loss of
them and every one who looks at the Parthenon intelligently regrets their
absence.
Letter to the Editor from Hamilton Fyfe, The Times, Dec. 12, 1940, at 5. Also support-
ing the plea by Hamilton Fyfe is the great-grandson of William Richard Hamilton, whose
great-grandfather, as Elgin's agent, fetched the Marbles to England. He wrote: "Thus,
Hamilton rescued the Greek Marbles for future generations [and] ... [h]is descendant
now suggests that at the conclusion of a victorious peace we return to Greece, as a re-
ward, the Elgin Marbles." Letter to the Editor, The Times, Dec. 19, 1940, at 5. But see
Letter to the Editor from Charles Wheeler, The Times, Dec. 16, 1940, at 5 (claiming the
Marbles as the common heritage of mankind).
Finally, under the aggressive leadership of internationally-known actress and then-
Minister of Culture and Education, Melina Mercouri, in 1983 the Greek government
formally requested that England return the Marbles to Greece. See 50 Parl. Deb., H.C.
(6th ser.) 379 (1983) (Written Answers). The British officially declined the request in
1984. See 58 Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) 188 (1984) (Written Answers).
83 Former Minister Mercouri perhaps put it most passionately: "The Marbles are
part of a monument to Greek identity, part of our deepest consciousness of the Greek
people: our roots, our continuity, our soul. The Parthenon is our flag." Sunday Times
[London], May 22, 1983, at 15, col. 1.
84 "[Society] is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in
every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained
in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living,
but between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are to be born."
Cf. Golding, Obligations to Future Generations, in RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERA-
TIONS, 61, 69 (E. Partridge ed. 1981) (quoting E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REvoLU-
TION IN FRANCE 93-94 (1910)).
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tures' memorialization of ancient artistic themes holds special mean-
ing today because it tells how the ancient Greeks viewed themselves
and the world around them. These themes reflect the "deep-seated
Greek will to define the emergence of order out of chaos."8 5 By so
doing, these themes remind today's Greeks what their ancestors
were like, which might affect their own future.
"The Parthenon has been, and is, for almost all Greeks the sym-
bol par excellence of their national identity, of their links with the past,
and of the contribution that they and their forefathers have made to
the civilization that we all share."'8 6 If the Greeks' mana (a force
which embodies a group's intangible source of strength and charac-
ter) exists anywhere, it must surely exist on the Acropolis Hill, ema-
nating from the gaping holes left in the Parthenon by the Marbles'
removal.
Because new visions of the past may serve social and political
ends, the loss of objects affecting such visions risks alienating a peo-
ple from their past. 87 Such a risk has particularly political connota-
tions to the extent it threatens nation-building and fosters cultural
amnesia.88 One can hardly think of property more bound up with a
group's identity than the Parthenon Marbles are to Greek identity.
Moreover, reliance upon the Parthenon Marbles as a source for
group awareness and continuity does not evince bad object rela-
tions. Rather, by promoting pride, understanding, group-actualiza-
tion, constitution, and historical continuity, the Marbles would yield
a positive social outcome to Greeks.
4. Intention to Dedicate as Grouphood Property
The artist's intention can also be instructive in determining
whether particular art is property for grouphood. The art and archi-
tecture commissioned by Pericles was quintessentially public. It was
solely intended to be created by and dedicated for the people.8 9
Pericles, as commissioner of the works, and Phidias, as chief de-
85 For example, much of the sculpture depicts Centauromachys and Amazo-
nomachys. "These themes become general archetypes, generic expressions, of specific
events.... [Flew Greeks would have missed an allusion to the triumph over the Per-
sians." J. POLLrrT, supra note 75, at 81-82.
86 C. HrrCHENS, supra note 2, at 25. The Marbles are essential to Greek identity
because they "tell [Greeks] who [they] are and where [they] came from." See Elsen,
Introduction: Why Do We Care About Art?, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 952 (1976).
87 McBryde, supra note 2, at 8.
88 Cf J. STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 114 (Penguin Books ed. 1976) ("How
will we know it's us without our past?").
89 See THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 148 (Penguin ed. 1954) ("Mighty in-
deed are the marks and monuments of our empire which we have left. Future ages will
wonder at us, as the present age wonders at us now.") (quoting Pericles' funeral ora-
tion). See also supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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signer, meant to create an enduring monument to their people, a
tribute to the ability of man, through order, to subjugate chaos and
barbarism.90
Furthermore, the scale and unity of all the Acropolis' monu-
ments corroborate an intent to dedicate art as an enduring site-spe-
cific memorial. Not only were the Marbles and the buildings
conceived and executed as a unified whole, but they also never were
conceived to "pass into the possession of a patron or to be bought
and sold on the art market." 91 Thus, the Parthenon is undeniably
public art.
The public character of this property serves to distinguish be-
tween art that should be freely alienable and that which might legiti-
mately be held under a regime of strict inalienability. Western art
enthusiasts have little cause for alarm that such definition of prop-
erty for grouphood sounds the bell of repatriation of all foreign art.
The case for repatriation of detached objects such as paintings, not
intended to be site-specific, and often profit-motivated, is a much
weaker case.92
5. Summing Up
The unique place in both Greek political and artistic history
that the Parthenon holds, its contribution to group awareness and
pride, its longstanding association with the Greek people, and its
intention to be publicly dedicated, all support a claim that the Mar-
bles are bound up with Greek grouphood. They are irreplaceable;
their absence has caused pain among Greeks.
Further, making the claim that Greek identity is bound up with
the Marbles is not an expression of bad object relations. This claim
is not fueled by an impulse to hoard, nor is it unduly materialistic.
Here, claims to special rights in property would not be fetishistic
because retention is sought to promote the salutary aims that prop-
erty for grouphood intends to encourage. Such art would not be
restrained merely to prevent others from possessing it.93 Greeks
would seek to retain such art because it fosters pride and remem-
brance of past glory, creates linkages, and allows for celebration of
Greek community. Claiming that the Marbles constitute property
for grouphood is consistent with the aim of promoting group devel-
90 See, e.g., J. POLLIrr, supra note 75, at 66 (describing the Periclean building pro-
gram as a monument to the victory over barbarism).
91 Browning, supra note 68, at 135.
92 See Dummett, supra note 41, at 319 n.9 ("Plainly, the case for the return of de-
tached objects such as easel paintings, not intended for any specific location, is in itself
less strong than for those that were never meant to be removed.").
93 "Objects of art constitute evidence of things other than themselves." Niec, Legis-
lative Models of Protection of Cultural Property, 27 HAST. LJ. 1089 (1976).
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GRANTING GROUP CONTROLS OVER EXTERNAL
RESOURCES-A REGIME OF STRICT
INALIENABILITY RULES TO PROTECT
PROPERTY FOR GROUPHOOD
Responding to an article advocating the return of the Parthe-
non Marbles to Greece, the editor of a nineteenth century magazine
94 This Note avoids the technical complexities of returning the Marbles, though by
defining them as meeting the criteria for property for grouphood the Note would argue
that they belong in Greece. Length of time of ownership, historic factors, group aware-
ness and continuity, and intention to dedicate as grouphood property make the Marbles
property for grouphood. While not arguments for classifying the Marbles as property
for grouphood, two other factors deserve mention to the extent they favor restitution of
the Marbles by demonstrating the superiority of a Greek moral claim to the Marbles.
First, the Marbles would stimulate and promote cultural flourishing in two ways.
They would advance scholarship and also stimulate derivative and responsive art. The
presence of such consequential art makes life "morally serious" and "aesthetically de-
lightful." See Bator, supra note 5, at 294 & 305. The Marbles' presence in Athens also
would create beneficial artistic results. Historian Adolph Holm admitted the Marbles'
power to spark creativity when he wrote: "when [the Marbles] had become better known
through their removal to London, they excited general admiration even among the best
artists, and they have effected a complete revolution in our conception of ancient art. It
is they which taught us what Greek art really was." 2 A. HOLM, supra note 1, at 266. The
superiority of a Greek claim over a universal claim based on the art's importance to
mankind, see infra section III, should be founded on its status as property for grouphood
which creates a morally superior claim.
Second, interests in artistic integrity favor restitution of the Marbles to Greece. Its
designers conceived and executed the Parthenon as part of a common plan. See C.
HrrcHENS, supra note 2, at 68. Hence, their removal has caused an aesethic revulsion by
debasing the values of compensation, tension, integration, and exaggeration achieved
by the Parthenon's celebrated application of optics and mechanics. SeeJ. POLLrrr, supra
note 75, at 71-95.
A strong impulse against dismemberment of art also supports reunification of the
pieces. SeeJ. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 66, at 54; Bator, supra note 5, at 295-99.
Even without a superior moral claim created by the Marbles' qualification as property for
grouphood, the Marbles ought to be returned to Greece to make a dismembered work
whole again. The value of artistic integrity was upheld in the celebrated case of Bernard
Buffet's refrigerator. See Merryman, The Refigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS LJ.
1023 (1976) (panel-by-panel disposition by purchaser of Buffet's decorated refrigerator
enjoined by the French courts as a violation of rights in the work's integrity).
Furthermore, the Acropolis effects a perfect integration of indigenous elements.
"The international community... has come to accept historic monuments as an integral
part of the environment in which they were created." United Nations General Assem-
bly, 42nd session, Provisional Record of the Forty-Seventh Meeting, held at headquar-
ters, New York, 22 October 1987, at 26 (comments by Mr. Al-Amin, Iraqi delegate).
Because the sculpture can be better understood and appreciated at its original site with
the ability of moving between the temples and sculptures, the Marbles' removal detracts
from both archaeological meaning and viewer appreciation. See Bator, supra note 5, at
305-06. Removal heightens the risk of losing historical evidence and disturbs viewer
appreciation in terms of both context and convenience. See id. at 301-02.
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hypothesized that if England returned the Marbles, the Greek gov-
ernment might "yield to an offer of a million sterling from Berlin, or
two million sterling from New York."9 5 After learning how essential
the Marbles are to Greek groupness, one might discount such a
prophecy.
Notwithstanding the Marbles' importance to Greek grouphood,
the traditional scholarship would uphold a voluntary transfer of the
Marbles by Greek authorities, even though an involuntary one might
create grounds for rescission. The traditional scholarship responds
to the evil of involuntary dispossession-theft and smuggling-in vi-
olation of protective national and international laws, but never con-
templates the possibility of complete inalienability. 96 In the absence
of involuntary dispossession, a full examination of the boundaries of
grouphood rights forces us to confront the question: "Could the
Greeks, themselves, voluntarily sell or give away the Marbles?" This
Note concludes they could not. Grouphood rights in group consti-
tution, identity, continuity, and development already advanced in
this Note justify this need for control over grouphood property in
the form of inalienability rules.
A. Distinguishing Market-Inalienability from Strict
Inalienability
This section further develops the already-existing parallel be-
tween property for personhood and property for grouphood by ar-
guing that protecting the former enhances human flourishing, while
protecting the latter analogously enhances communal flourishing.
To the extent that varying degrees of restraints on alienation are
needed to secure the goal of flourishing under each regime, this sec-
tion explains the divergence between these parallel theories. The
section concludes that while mere market-inalienability sufficiently
removes any impediments to human flourishing, for communal
95 See C. HrrCHENS, supra note 2, at 68.
96 See, e.g., Note, supra note 11, at 97 (based on a system of import and export re-
strictions, the UNESCO Convention, see supra note 2, protects cultural property only to
the extent than an individual nation creates such restrictions). But even those countries
that have nationalized their cultural property and claim any export violates their national
law have met with uncertain results. "International legal authorities consider these laws
complicated and ambiguous, causing problems not only for the governments that en-
acted them but also for those nations in which the importation of art is 'big business.' "
Id. "The developed nations have been reluctant to assist in enforcing such bans because
of what they perceive as clearly legitimate interests in the free international flow of
art .. " Rogers, supra note 5, at 934-35. Moreover, critics argue that such bars create
and perpetuate the black market, ultimately undermining protection. Id. Merryman &
Elsen, supra note 11, at 6 (delineating, among other things, "the elements of an interest-
sensitive and enforceable international policy toward art smuggling and theft ....").
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flourishing to obtain, an absolute ban on transferability is required.
Such an absolute ban is a strict inalienability rule.
Advocating inalienability usually sparks controversy because
property universally is presumed fully alienable.97 While much of
this presumption stems from the elevation of the marketplace as the
final arbiter of economic rights, the popular emphasis on negative,
as opposed to positive, liberty goes far toward explaining the pre-
sumption of full alienability.98 Traditionally, this emphasis has
made the protection of cultural property difficult 99 because negative
liberty eschews inalienability by defining freedom as "doing (or not
doing) whatever [one], as an individual, prefer[s] at the moment, as
long as [one does] not harm[] others."' 00 A negative liberty ap-
proach assumes that inalienability is both paternalistic 0 1 and a free-
97 Radin, supra note 20, at 1851. See also L. BECKER, supra note 12, at 20 ("[The
right to capital] is the most fundamental.., of the elements, if only because it includes
the right to destroy, consume, and alienate.").
But according to Grey, "discourse about property has fragmented into a set of dis-
continuous usages." Grey, supra note 12, at 72. Hence, the notion of a bundle of rights
in property explains the modern view of property in which both the traditional notion of
ownership has dissolved, and the necessary connection between property rights and
things has been eliminated. Id. at 69.
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1978), is consistent with this approach. Andrus up-
held a prohibition against the sale of bird parts lawfully taken before the effective date of
federal protection pursuant to the Eagle Protection Act. The prohibition did not effect a
taking because
the regulations challenged ... do not compel surrender of the artifacts,
and there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them. Rather, a signif-
icant restriction has been imposed on one means of disposing of the arti-
facts. But the denial of one traditional right does not always amount to a
taking. At least where an owner possesses a full "bundle" of property
rights, the destruction of one "strand" of the bundle is not a taking, be-
cause the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.
Id at 65-66 (citations omitted).
98 See Radin supra note 20, at 1898-1903.
99 See, e.g., Tay, Law and the Cultural Heritage, in WHO OWNS THE PAST?, supra note 2,
at 107 ("[T]he primary problem in liberal democracies has been and is to preserve and
protect antiquities in a society that readily permits them to pass into or remain in private
ownership and that recognizes the great complexities that surround just and equitable
interference with ownership.").
100 Radin, supra note 20, at 1899. "'Negative liberty' means roughly the freedom of
the individual to be let alone to do whatever she chooses so long as others are not
harmed." Id at 1898 n.186.
Typical of this view is Mill's declaration that " 'included in the idea of private prop-
erty' is a right of each person 'to the exclusive disposal of what he or she have produced
by their own exertions, or received either by gift or by fair agreement without force or
fraud, from those who produced it.'" Mill, however, also argued for inalienabilities
where the laws of property "have made property of things which ought not to be prop-
erty ...." Id. at 1889 (quotingJ.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLInCAL ECONOMY bk. II, ch.
ii. at 218 (W. Ashley ed. 1909)).
101 Radin, supra note 20, at 1898. See also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 30, at
1113 (arguing that two "efficiency reasons for forbidding the sale of entitlements under
certain circumstances" are self-paternalism and true paternalism). A negative liberty
approach finds inalienability paternalistic because it prevents some willing buyers and
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dom-diminishing affront to autonomy.10 2
Adopting a positive view of liberty that includes proper self-de-
velopment as a requirement for freedom may, however, yield a dif-
ferent result.103 In the personhood context, a positive liberty
analysis replaces the concept of paternalism with that of human
flourishing. Restrictions are not just "for our own good," but in-
stead enhance our ability for self-actualization. A positive liberty
approach sees market-inalienability as eliminating all obstacles to
the achievement of human flourishing by preventing monetization
of those items essential to personhood.10 4 Constitutive elements of
personhood are not treated as fungible. Thereby, human dignity
commands deserved respect.
In the context of group rights, however, even a hypothetical
scenario most offensive to universal commodifierst 0 5-strict inalien-
ability of the Parthenon Marbles despite unanimous accord to trans-
fer them among the Greek people-could be justified by reference
to the concepts of communal flourishing 06 and intergenerational
justice10 7 without lapsing into paternalism. Therefore, a positive
sellers from agreeing upon an entitlement shift. By curtailing individual freedom in this
way, paternalism assumes buyers and sellers are incapable, in some instances, of assess-
ing their own best interests.
102 But see J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 249 (1971) ("It is also rational for [the
parties] to protect themselves against their own irrational inclinations by consenting to a
scheme of penalties that may give them a sufficient motive to undo foolish actions and
by accepting certain impositions designed to undo the unfortunate consequences of
their imprudent behavior."); Husak, Paternalism and Autonomy, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 27,
29 (1980) ("Some instances of paternalism do not diminish, but actually 'preserve a
wider range of freedom for the individual'...."). And who could say that Odysseus'
binding himself to the ship's mast to avoid the Sirens' deadly lure was an invidious in-
fringement on autonomy. Indeed, his example illustrates the possibility of paternalistic
acts maximizing, rather than diminishing, autonomy. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, bk.
XXII, lines 64-68 (R. Fitzgerald trans. Anchor Books ed. 1963).
103 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 20, at 1899 (arguing that under a positive view of lib-
erty the "inalienabilities needed to foster [proper] development will be seen as freedom-
enhancing rather than as impositions of unwanted restraints on our desires .... ). I
assume in this Note that the individual goal of self-development fully translates into an
analogous grouphood goal.
104 Id. at 1885.
105 Universal commodifiers would support a system under which everything com-
mands a price, and can be sold in the marketplace.
106 Communal flourishing is simply an analogue to the concept of human flourishing
already developed. See supra note 21. If individuals can experience flourishing as a re-
sult of their relationships with objects, presumably a group can similarly flourish given
the proper object-relation. Like human flourishing, communal flourishing is the hoped-
for outcome of our relationships with objects. Objects can promote communal flourish-
ing when they are bound up with grouphood and when their retention is not fetishistic.
107 The concept of intergenerational justice envisions certain obligations running
through time to distant past or succeeding future generations, or both. A commitment
to intergenerational concerns is usually expressed by sensitivity to distributive fairness
between generations. See Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of
Servitude Restrictions, 70 IoWA L. REv. 615, 634 n.86 (1985) (While treating intergenera-
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liberty analysis views inalienability of property for grouphood as
freedom-enhancing because it provides the necessary control over
those objects which facilitate group development in both the pres-
ent and the future. Strict inalienability thereby contributes to com-
munal flourishing.
Conceiving of personhood or grouphood in market rhetoric by
commodifying objects and attributes so essential to personal or
group being-treating them as monetizable and alienable from the
self or the group-violates both our deepest understanding of what
it is to be either human or a community. Radin prescribes a regime
of market-inalienability as consistent with the goal of promoting
property for personhood. In seeking to prevent the evil of com-
modification, market-inalienability prohibits only sales, not gifts.
Three reasons support responding to potential personhood vi-
olations by prohibiting sales. First, many sales which appear to vio-
late personhood arouse suspicion of coercion. Banning these sales
seeks to ensure free choice by the best possible coercion-avoidance
device. Second, market rhetoric creates and fosters an inferior con-
ception of human flourishing.1 08 Third, a slippery slope threatens
to effect market domination. This third justification assumes that
sometimes commodified and noncommodified versions of certain
interactions or things cannot coexist; and, in those cases, the
noncommodified versions are morally preferable. 0 9
tion justice as a fairness issue the author concedes that "[i]ntergenerational fairness
could reasonably be treated as an efficiency problem in itself."). For example, "justice
between generations may be better achieved by intervening in microeconomic transac-
tions that are likely to have an impact on future generations, even if the intervention
does not maximize current surplus." Id. at 636. See generally E. PARTRIDGE, RESPONSIBIL-
ITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (E. Partridge ed. 1981) (chronicling several essays on the
subject of duties to posterity); Baier, For the Sake of Future Generations, in EARTHBOUND:
NEw INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICs 214 (J. Regan ed. 1984). See also
infra note 133 and accompanying text.
108 Radin describes the response to this problem as an assimilation to prohibition.
Radin, supra note 20, at 1912 ("Something might be prohibited in its market form be-
cause it both creates and exposes wealth- and class-based contingencies for obtaining
things that are critical to life itself... and thus undermines a commitment to the sanctity
of life .... [Furthermore,] for example, we accept an inferior conception of personhood
... if we suppose people may freely chooses to commodify themselves.") (footnote omit-
ted). Cf id. at 1926-27 ("Conceiving of any child in market rhetoric wrongs per-
sonhood. . . . In the worst case, market rhetoric could create a commodified self-
conception in everyone, as a result of commodifying every attribute that differentiates
US.").
Similarly, conceiving of property for grouphood in market terms harms grouphood.
See Merryman, supra note 5, at 482 n.12 (quoting Thomas, Goya Portrait to Go Back to
Spain, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1986, at C30, col. 4 ("We could not allow something which
we consider part of our historical heritage ... to become the object of common trade
•... '1).
109 Radin refers to this justification as the domino theory. Radin, supra note 20 at
1912-13. "Under this theory, the existence of some commodified sexual interactions [,
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Market-inalienability still permits gratuitous transfers as not vi-
olative of human flourishing. For example, while baby-selling, pros-
titution, and the sale of body parts might be restrained, adoption,
consensual, nonmonetized sexual intercourse, and organ gifts
would surely be permitted under a regime of market-inalienabil-
ity.110 Such gratuitous transfers do not violate human flourishing
because sharing is an ideal which contributes to human flourishing.
Hence, donating organs, engaging in noncommodified sexual rela-
tions, and adoption all enhance human flourishing because the do-
nor is uplifted by his voluntary gift without being irreparably
disadvantaged. In addition, the donee is made better off by ac-
cepting the gift. To the extent that we must not assimilate our con-
ception of personhood to the market, but can still gratuitously
transfer consistent with the established view of human flourishing,
market-inalienabilities are justified." I
While personhood and grouphood rights remain parallel thus
far, they diverge over the requisite degree of inalienability needed
to protect each. Market-inalienabilities sufficiently guarantee per-
sonhood rights in property because gratuitous transfers are not in-
consistent with human flourishing but rather may often encourage
and create it. On the other hand, market-inalienability fails to guard
group rights in property because all transfers, both monetized and
gratuitous, must be prohibited to effectuate communal flourishing.
Only a strict inalienability rule can prevent the grouphood evil of
dispossession, by prohibiting all transfers-gratuitous or not.
At least three reasons explain why grouphood property de-
for example,] will contaminate or infiltrate everyone's sexuality so that all sexual rela-
tionships will become commodified. If it is morally required that noncommodified sex
be possible, market-inalienability would bejustified." Id. at 1913.
A similar analysis could well apply to commodification of babies or any other prefer-
ably noncommodified subjects. Id. at 1922.
110 For a discussion of commodified versus noncommodified sexuality, see Radin,
supra note 20, at 1921-25; reproductive capacity, see id. at 1925-36; and body parts, see
Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLuM. L. REv. 931,
948-49 (1985). Cf National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 274(e) (Supp. V.
1987) (banning organ sales in interstate commerce); UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GiFr Acr
§ 10, 8A U.L.A. (West Supp. 1989).
In the grouphood context, intercultural exchanges, including visiting museum exhi-
bitions from source nations, could mitigate conflicting interests by promoting intercul-
tural flourishing without undermining communal flourishing because indefeasible
ownership would still be retained by the source nation. See Merryman, supra note 1, at
849 (proposing that instead of selling pieces of national cultural heritage, important
subjects might be traded among museums on loan to enrich the ability of host nations to
expose its people to other cultures). See also Was This Statue Stolen?, The Nat'l L.J., Nov.
14, 1988, at 33 ("The answer, most agree, lies in an imaginative, cooperative approach
.... Several museums have returned illegally exported works of art-but in exchange
for loans, or exhibitions from the countries of origin.").
1 11 See Radin, supra note 20, at 1927.
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mands absolute restraints on alienation. Turning to the Parthenon
Marbles again illustrates these reasons. First, all the factors sup-
porting the Marbles' importance to the Greek community depend
upon actual possession of the very thing itself. A market-inalienabil-
ity rule cannot protect the grouphood interest because, by allowing
the gratuitous transfer of grouphood property, the essential posses-
sory interest would be forfeited. Only a strict inalienability rule
completely protects the grouphood interest in property by prohibit-
ing all transfers and thereby averting the grouphood evil of dispos-
session. In the personhood context developed above, dispossession
is not the evil prevented, only the use of market rhetoric to describe
particularly personal "things" is.
Second, unlike some of Radin's examples, the Marbles are
nonreplenishable resources. Perhaps the evil of dispossession is not
so acute in the, personhood context precisely because such sharing is
not a zero-sum game.1 12 The interests of the transferee and trans-
feror need not be antagonistic. The transferor can give up the thing
without also surrendering her capacity to give up another "thing" or
retain another "thing" in the future. For example, by offering her
child for adoption, the transferor has not ordinarily surrendered her
capacity to bear additional children. Even the example of organ do-
nation supports this view. Organs are available for donation only
when their loss will not imperil the donor. Regulation of organ do-
nation strictly prohibits the lifetime transfer of necessary,
nonreplenishable organs.1 13
Third, intergenerational justice demands the prohibition of any
transfers.' 14 Because the Greek community's membership is always
partially unascertained, 1 5 a transfer of grouphood property by cur-
112 A zero-sum game "is one in which the payoffs to the players in any outcome add
up to zero; what one player gains, the other[s] must necessarily lose." A. COLMAN, GAME
THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL GAMES 47 (1982). Unlike those games, here, there are
"prospects for mutually profitable collaboration." Id
113 See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. (West 1983).
114 See supra note 107. Intuitively, it is not difficult to understand that there might
be differences in this context between the way groups are treated and the way individu-
als are treated. We are less concerned about property transfers of individuals because
they alone must assume the consequences of a bad transfer. The law will still intervene,
however, to prevent an individual from effecting certain transfers-e.g., the implied war-
ranty of habitability, see, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 81-82
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); prohibition against selling oneself into slav-
ery, see infra note 143; inalienability of the right to life, see, e.g., Feinberg, Voluntary Eutha-
nasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 PHIL. & PuB. AFFS. 93 (1978). However, in a group
setting the law's focus should change. Here, the consequences of a bad transfer invaria-
bly fall on the shoulders of blameless future members.
115 Fiss's theory of groups wo uld allow for reference to groups by their unascer-
tained members. Cf Fiss, supra note 60, at 148 ("You can talk about the group without




rently ascertained members necessarily alienates the unascertained
members from their own identity. Any transfer fundamentally vio-
lates the communal flourishing goal of grouphood property by di-
vesting part of the group's experience and existence. Hence, rather
than a regime of market-inalienability, only a regime of strict inal-
ienability can sufficiently protect group rights in property.11 6
B. Traditional Justifications for Imposing Strict Inalienability
Despite prevalent assumptions of property's full alienability,
strict inalienability maintains some intuitive appeal. 17 These intui-
tive rationales translate broadly into either one of two traditional
categories for justifying the imposition of strict inalienability: con-
cerns for economic efficiency or distributional goals.118 But the
116 Professor Rose-Ackerman refers to strict inalienability as pure inalienability. She
envisions a matrix of four quadrants: in quadrant A, termed pure property, both sales
and gifts are permitted; in quadrant B, modified property, sales are permitted while gifts
are prohibited (e.g., bankruptcy rules condemn as fraudulent conveyances those gifts
made before a declaration of bankruptcy but uphold sales of assets as legal so long as
reasonable equivalent value is received); in quadrant C, modified inalienability, gifts are
permitted, but sales are forbidden (this corresponds to Radin's market-inalienability);
and, in quadrant D, pure inalienability, both gifts and sales are prohibited. Rose-Acker-
man, supra note 110, at 950.
117 This intuitive appeal follows from the belief that "we have no right to destroy or
suppress what happens, just for the present, to be in our power, for past, present, and
future all have rights in the surviving monuments of human endeavour." McBryde,
supra note 2, at 7 (citation omitted). Such an appeal permeated General Makriyannis's
statements to his soldiers urging them never to sell Greek artwork to foreigners, re-
printed supra note 2. That war hero of the Greek Revolution admonished two would-be
antiquity-peddlers against the alienation of those things for which they fought the war of
independence. Responding to Makriyannis's wisdom, Nobel Laureate George Seferis
wrote: "There is more weight in [that] sentence of a simple man than in the effusions of
fifteen gilded academics, because it is only in feelings like this that the culture of a nation
can be rooted-in real feelings, and not in abstractions about the beauty of our former
ancestors or in hearts that have become dried up from a cataleptic fear of the common
people." C. HITCHENS, supra note 2, at 66.
118 Boiled down from the variously individuated rationales advanced by prominent
scholars, the justifications for strict inalienability are: (1) "the practical control of exter-
nalities," Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 970 (1985) (arguing that
"rules restraining alienability are best accounted for, both positively and normatively, by
the need to control problems of external harm and the common pool"). Id. at 990; (2)
"economic efficiency itself," Rose-Ackerman, supra note 110, at 932 (arguing that "eco-
nomic efficiency itself may require restrictions .. [even] beyond the .. problems of
externality control to include imperfect information, 'prisoner's dilemmas,' free rider
problems, and the cost of administering alternative policies"). Id. See also Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 30, at 1093-98 (finding that efficiency objectives justify inalienabil-
ity in the case of externalities, difficulty of calculation of external costs (moralisms), self-
paternalism (which is still fullyconsistent with Pareto-efficiency criteria because the indi-
vidual chooses what is best in the long run rather than in the short run), and true pater-
nalism); (3) "specialized distributive goals," Rose-Ackerman, supra note 110, at 933
(reasoning that certain "distributive goals can only be achieved through some kind of
inalienability rule [because normal] program[s] of taxes and transfers may be inade-
quate"). See B. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAw 237 (1975)
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lines distinguishing these categories often blur." 9 For example, a
robust conception of intergenerational justice necessarily supposes
the creation of externalities, thereby fueling the efficiency argument
behind our unarticulated intuition that current group members
should be prevented from alienating certain cultural property. 120
Yet, the concern for fairness to future generations likewise consti-
tutes a justification for imposing strict inalienability over property
for grouphood.
1. Economic Efficiency
Three main justifications for inalienability flow from economic
efficiency. First, some things are either so plentiful or unbounded
that the costs of privatizing any such resources outweigh the bene-
fits of privitization. Such goods command a regime of inalienabil-
ity. 12' Air is a good example.
Second, market failure typically justifies intervention in the
form of restraints upon alienation. Although the term market fail-
ure generally signifies the problem of externalities, it has independ-
ent meaning too. For example, monopolistic behavior resulting in
market failure might not implicate externalities concerns.
Futhermore, markets often work poorly because information is both
("[A]n economically sophisticated commitment to a private property regime does not
necessarily compel a commitment to laissez-faire. Even when the problem of monopoly
and oligopoly is put aside, there exist a broad range of situations in which-depending
on one's theory of distributivejustice-a broad range of affirmative governmental initia-
tives may seem plausible."). See also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 30, at 1114-15; (4)
market control, Rose-Ackerman, supra note 110, at 933 (arguing that "unfettered market
processes may be incompatible with the responsible functioning of a democratic state");
(5) when "the difficulty of privatization outweighs the gains in careful resource manage-
ment," Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53
U. CHi. L. REv. 711, 717 (1986) (reasoning that some "things are either so plentiful or
so unbounded that it is not worth the effort to create a system of resource management
for them"). Id.; (6) "compensation for market failure," id. at 719; (7) "inherently public
property," id. at 720 (finding that such property, owned by society at large, gives each
member of some 'public' [or group] a bundle of rights, neither entirely alienable by the
state or other collective action).
119 This Note recognizes this taxonomic messiness and perhaps contributes to it.
To the extent that the question of intergenerational justice implicates the creation of
externalities, it is treated as an efficiency-based justification for imposing strict inaliena-
bility over property for grouphood. But, to the extent distributive justice and fairness
norms require present generations to treat their successors with care, these notions are
advanced instead of efficiency reasons to justify strict inalienability.
120 Cf Sterk, supra note 107, at 634 n.86 ("And because those seeking to create a
servitude cannot obtain the consent of the unborn, any effects the servitude has on the
unborn are properly considered externalities."). Externalities exist when X makes a de-
cision about how to use resources without accounting for the effects of that decision
upon others. Typically, X will ignore such effects precisely because they fall on others.
They are external to him. See J. DUKEMINIER &J. KRIER, PROPERTY 52-57 (1981).
121 See Rose, supra note 118, at 717.
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imperfect and asymmetrical.1 22
Third, and most importantly, "the practical control of externali-
ties" often warrants imposing strict inalienability.1 23 Externalities
play a central role in justifying restraints on the alienability of the
Parthenon Marbles. Because membership in the Greek community
is not voluntary, but rather ascribed, there are always unascertained
members of the group.' 24 Without knowing the exact persons that
will enter the group, we do know with fair certainty that new mem-
bers will invariably come to exist. For this reason, difficulties arise
when present generations seek to alienate property for grouphood.
Ascertained group members simply cannot account for the
preferences of unascertained members. American law deals with an
analogous problem in the trust setting. 125 Prohibiting the alienation
of the trust res by the beneficial owners squarely raises the conflict
between intergenerational justice and the interests of presently ex-
isting class members.1 26 Trust law's resolution is the Claflin doc-
trine.' 27 This doctrine protects future group members' interests in
the res by allowing trust termination or modification only where all
of the beneficiaries unanimously consent and the termination or
modification would not defeat the settlor's material purpose in cre-
ating the trust.
Consent of all beneficiaries includes all potential beneficiaries:
born or unborn, ascertained or unascertained, no matter how con-
tingent their interests may seem. The practical effect, then, of leav-
ing a remainder to a class of descendants is to create an indefinite
class of beneficiaries whose consent simply cannot be obtained.
Thus, in such settings the trust res remains outside of the control of
122 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 110, at 938.
123 Epstein considers this to be the only sound justification for inalienability. See
Epstein, supra note 118, at 990; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 30, at 1111; Rose-
Ackerman, supra note 110, at 932. See also Radin, supra note 20, at 1867 n.60 and accom-
panying text.
124 Membership in ascriptive groups is imputed instead of chosen in any ordinary
sense.
125 The trust analogy is particularly helpful in the context of the Parthenon Marbles.
A nineteenth century philhellene quoted by Hitchens regarding his travel in Greece
said, "[y]et I cannot forbear mentioning a singular speech of a learned Greek of Ioan-
nina, who said to me, 'You English are carrying off all the works of the Greeks, our
forefathers; preserve them well, Greeks will come to redemand them.'" C. HrrcHENS,
supra note 2, at 65. Additionally, during the Parliamentary debates concerning the
"purchase of" the Marbles from Elgin, one Member of Parliament proposed an amend-
ment to the decree that Britain hold the Marbles in trust until Greek independence. Id.
126 While many scholars agree that the present generation must consider the inter-
ests of future generations, see infra notes 144-55 and accompanying text, others reso-
lutely object to the subordination of present generations' preferences to the interests of
future generations. See Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1353, 1360 (1982).
127 Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889).
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the beneficial owners.1 28
Were vicarious representation of unascertained interests to be
considered a satisfactory resolution of the intergenerational justice
problem, consistent application of the Claflin analogy would still
prohibit the divestiture of the Parthenon Marbles because a hypo-
thetical present generation's desire to transfer the Marbles would
defeat a material purpose of the trust. Assuming an intention to
publicly dedicate the Parthenon, 29 alienation of the Marbles would
violate the hypothetical trust by undermining Pericles' material pur-
pose of facilitating future Greeks' understanding of their identity,
heritage, art, and history. This is particularly important to Greek
grouphood because its cultural integrity and continuity has been the
subject of attack.' 30
Speculation about or attempts to infer a trust settlor's purpose
are perfectly permissible. This construction of Pericles' purpose is
wholly reasonable given both contemporaneous accounts 3 1 and the
scale and site-specificity of the Acropolis project. Applied to the
Marbles, the analytic underpinnings of the Claflin doctrine favor a
strict inalienability rule.
Many who argue against Claflin's deference to future benefi-
ciaries would likely contend that efficiency demands granting the
present generation full hegemony over property because it, as a
group of rational interest-maximizers, will put the property to its
most efficient use. The externalities argument answers that any in-
terest calculus would be necessarily incomplete for its inability to
evaluate the preferences of future generations. 132 They simply can-
not influence the market. Often the calculations of the present gen-
eration's best interest will, in fact, clash with the interest of future
generations.133 In response, the law freezes the ascertained benefi-
128 Some American jurisdictions, however, have allowed for the possibility of vicari-
ous consent by permitting a guardian ad litem to represent unborn or unascertained per-
sons. See, e.g., Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
129 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
130 Theories such as Falimerayer's, see supra note 62, persist in some circles sug-
gesting that the Greeks are not really Greek. For an excellent discussion of the cultural
continuity and 'karma' of the Greeks through four distinct epochs-Mycenaean, Classi-
cal, Byzantine, and Modern-see generally A. TOYNBEE, supra note 62. A most promi-
nent historian, Professor Toynbee, recanted much of his earlier work by concluding that
Greek cultural continuity is unshakably clear.
131 See Thucydides, supra note 89.
132 The "[ilnability to obtain the consent of unborn individuals is, in some sense, the
ultimate transaction cost. And because those seeking to create a servitude cannot obtain
the consent of the unborn, any effects the servitude has on the unborn are properly
considered externalities." Sterk, supra note 107, at 634 n.86.
133 This clash is squarely focused, for example, in the environmental area. Present
generations' interests often correspond with maximization of use which invariably di-
minishes future values and imposes severe costs on future generations for which they
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ciaries' freedom to alienate the property.
But why, one might ask, should we prefer the interests of those
yet to exist when those now living all agree upon a transfer?
13 4
Moreover, what gives us confidence that future generations' prefer-
ences will diverge sharply from the preferences of the current gen-
eration? 3 5 The concept of "use" answers both of these questions.
In our example, any generation deciding to alienate the Marbles
would have already appreciated the Marbles' "use." It would have
identified itself as a group, understood its link to past greatness,
known the artistic spirit of its forefathers. In short, it would have
"used" the Marbles for all of those purposes for which property for
grouphood exists. The current generation would have depleted the
resource, or at least its marginal utility, for itself. To it, the attend-
ant costs of alienation would be diminished. This distinction based
on the notion of "use" necessarily guarantees that future genera-
tions' preferences will be hostile to a present preference for trans-
fer. While a current generation of Greeks might favor alienation of
its cultural patrimony, such as by transfer of the Parthenon Marbles,
future Greeks would disfavor alienation precisely because they will
not have enjoyed property for grouphood and its attendant impact
on and benefit to group rights.
136
receive no concomitant benefit, creating a "tragedy of the commons." For a compre-
hensive examination of this problem, see Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, 57
AM. ECON. REv. 347 (1967).
A well-developed conception of intergenerational justice expects that present gen-
erations, even if empowered to do so, should not disadvantage future generations cur-
rently unrepresented. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. Cf Sterk, supra note
107, at 634-35 ("Protecting future generations from dead hand control has been a per-
vasive theme in property law. The rule against perpetuities, prohibitions against novel
estates, and more modern regulations of the environment and of historical landmarks
are all designed at least in part to prevent one generation from controlling the destiny of
its successors.").
134 A plausible answer in trust law is the preservation and preference of the settlor's
autonomy. The ascertained remaindermen see the decision not to let anyone decide the
Marbles' fate as itself a decision favoring future generations. They wonder at the para-
dox of the law's response which frustrates their wishes with no corresponding guarantee
of at least fulfilling the wishes of their heirs. See, e.g., DeGeorge, The Environment, Rights,
and Future Generations, in RESPONSIBILITMES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 157, 161 (E. Par-
tridge ed. 1981) ("To ascribe present rights to future generations is to fall into the trap
of [improperly sacrificing] the present to the future, on grounds that there will possibly
... be so innumerably many future generations, each of which has a presently equal
right to what is now available, as to dwarf the rights of present people to existing
goods."). However, this argument ignores that future generations will be similarly re-
strained when they come into possession of the restrained resource.
135 Some commentators are convinced that proving a divergence among the prefer-
ences of present and future generations is difficult. See Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy
and He is Us or Conflict and Contradiction in Environmental Law, 12 ENvrL. L. 283, 297 (1982)
("There are few decisions favorable to our wishes that cannot be justified by a likely
story about future preferences.").
136 See supra note 133.
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Issues of intergenerational justice in this area are quite different
from the issues implicated when property is burdened by some ser-
vitude or restriction.' 3 7 In the latter setting, focus is placed upon
the transaction costs and externalities imposed upon future third-
party takers who obtain the property subject to restriction. Because
the original takers may be able to account for these costs to future
third parties, those externalities may never be passed on. Instead,
they are internalized by the initial bargain.138 By contrast, our pres-
ent generation sellers, unlike the original buyers of burdened prop-
erty who calculate future difficulties in disposing of the restricted
land by demanding a compensating discount, need never account
for the concerns of future generations who "lost" the "use" of the
now-alienated property. Unlike future buyers, our "future losers"
have no influence on the market; externalities imposed upon them
are never internalized.
Finally, even the most simple articulation of the externalities ar-
gument favors retention of property for grouphood. For example, if
an art treasure satisfying the requirements of grouphood property is
sold, all generations bear the cost, while only the current one re-
ceives the benefit. Thus, even though the cost per generation of
such dispossession is outweighed, the aggregate cost through time,
from generation to generation, would undoubtedly exceed any
purchase price commanded in the present market.
2. Specialized Distributional Goals: Other Policies Supporting Strict
Inalienability
Totally leaving behind the economic rationale, property for
grouphood merits strict inalienability protection as an exercise in
distributive justice. 139 For those unmoved by economic arguments
accounting heavily for future generational interests, the notion that
137 Although beyond this Note's scope, the responsibility of present generations to
retain important cultural property could be cast in the form of a negative servitude. The
analogy to the law of servitudes, particularly relevant on the question of intergenera-
tional justice, has been examined in several fine sources. See, e.g., Alexander, Freedom,
Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 883 (1988); Epstein, supra note
126; Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 956 (1988); Sterk, supra
note 107.
138 See Epstein, supra note 126, at 1360 ("If a seller insists that a personal convenant
bind the land even though it works to the disadvantage of the immediate or even future
purchasers, then the seller will have to accept a reduction in the purchase price to make
good his sentiments.").
139 "The concept of distributive justice centers on the fairness of... the distribution
of conditions and goods ...." M. DEUTSCH, DISTRIBtrrIvE JUSTICE 1 (1985). "If the
economist is concerned with making markets efficient, the philosopher is concerned with
making markets fair. Particular distributive justice issues on which philosophers have




"unfettered market processes may be incompatible with the respon-
sible functioning of a democratic state" should provide a second,
entirely distinct, series of rationales for restraining the alienability of
property for grouphood.1 40
Distributive aims presuppose that states or groups have some
duties to assure fair distribution and, when necessary, fair redistri-
bution. Here, this Note assumes policymakers legitimately may ben-
efit a particular group as an exercise in fairness. Intergenerational
justice, first discussed as an efficiency-based justification for holding
property for grouphood strictly inalienable, also animates the fair-
ness inquiry.
By building a strong case for the importance of property for
grouphood, the necessity of strict inalienability to protect those
rights was implied: future Greeks deserve to derive the same bene-
fits from the Marbles that earlier generations did. By transferring
that property which defines it, the group would be alienating its own
raison d'etre, its identity. Without adequate protections of its heri-
tage, a future generation might lose that important sense of being
part of something bigger than itself.14 1 Indeed, Burke wrote in a
celebrated line that society "is a partnership of the dead, the living,
and the unbom."1 42 This notion of partnership implies obligations
to both past and future generations. A transfer of cultural property,
like the Marbles, so vital to grouphood could effect an abdication of
future liberty without which . the group would lapse from
existence. 14
3
Most commentators agree that the present generation must, at
very least, account for the interests of future generations. 144 Fair-
140 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 110, at 933. See also Ackerman, supra note 118, at
237.
141 Cf Derr, The Obligation to the Future, in RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS
37, 39 (E. Partridge ed. 1981) ("Seeking a way to overcome the threat of death, a man
may identify himself with his group, which will outlive him. So he has a real interest in
its future well-being .... ).
142 See R. NISBET, supra note 44, at 25. "Mutilate the roots of society and tradition,
and the result must inevitably be the isolation of a generation from its heritage, the
isolation of individuals from their fellow men, and the creation of the sprawling faceless
masses." Id.
143 Cf Radin, supra note 20, at 1902 n.201 and accompanying text (quoting fromJ.S.
MILL, ON LIBERTY, in THREE ESSAYS 126 (1975)):
[B]y selling himself for a slave, [a person] abdicates his liberty; he
foregoes any future use of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats,
in his own case, the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him
to dispose of himself .... The principle of freedom cannot require that
he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to
alienate his freedom.
144 See, e.g., the essays collected in RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (E.
Partridge ed. 1981). See also Hubin,Justice and Future Generations, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 70,
72 (1976) (describing Rawls's answer to protecting future generations as extending a
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ness ought to require an ethic that each generation pass on its re-
sources in at least no worse shape than it found them.1 45 We may
choose to benefit future generations because our children are mem-
bers of the succeeding generation, 146 because of our own yearning
for immortality through group perpetuation,147 or because protect-
ing resources is not merely showing concern or respect to future
generations but also is an exercise in self-respect. 148 Or we may do
so because we see ourselves as members of a cross-generational
community belonging to enduring families, cultures, nations, and
traditions, 149 because we feel obliged to preserve our community
and transmit our cultural heritage, 150 or because, by worrying about
our own immediate future, we incidentally ensure that the lot of fu-
ture generations is better. ' 5 1 Regardless, the result is the same: we
act on our recognition of our kinship with those who have gone
before us and those yet to come.
152
Among the greatest of obligations the present has to the future
is the duty to transmit a heritage and memory. 153 Any present gen-
eration of Greeks possessed of the Marbles could not, without
veil of ignorance to the agents' knowledge of the generation to which they belong so
that each would be motivated to treat future generations of which they may be members
fairly); Kant, Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Purpose, Eighth Proposition, in
KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS 50 (H. Reiss ed. 1970) ("[H]uman nature is such that it
cannot be indifferent even to the most remote epoch which may eventually affect our
species, so long as this epoch can be expected with certainty.") But see Passmore, Conser-
vation, in RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 45, 51 (E. Partridge ed. 1981)
("The uncertainty of the harms [to future generations] we are hoping to prevent would,
in general, entitle us to ignore them .... ); Schwartz, Obligations to Posterity, in OBLIGA-
TIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (R.I. Sikora & B. Barry eds. 1978) (arguing that "we've
no obligation extending indefinitely or even terribly far into the future to provide any
widespread, continuing benefits to our descendants.").
145 "In so far as such inherited public goods as constitutions, civil liberties, universi-
ties, parks, and uncontaminated water come to us by the deliberate intention of past
generations, we inherit them not as sole beneficiaries but as persons able to share and
pass on such goods to an indefinite run of future generations." Baier, supra note 107, at
173.
146 See generally Wald, A Better Worldfor the Children, in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIcS 173 (D.
Scoby ed. 1971).
147 See supra note 141.
148 See Sagoff, supra note 135, at 302.
149 See Baier, supra note 107, at 177.
150 See Golding, Obligations to Future Generations, in RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GEN-
ERATIONS 61, 63-66 (E. Partridge ed. 1981).
151 Sterk, supra note 107, at 635.
152 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. Cf Callahan, What Obligations Do We
Have to Future Generations?, in RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 74 (E. Partridge
ed. 1981) ('Just as we can trace the roots of our culture back at least 3,000 years, future
generations will be able to trace theirs. To proceed as if there will be no relationship
between the now and the then would be, at the very least, silly .... ").
153 Our obligation requires that we provide future group members with "a heritage,
natural and cultural, that can be valued and enjoyed without absurdity." Sagoff, supra
note 135, at 300. Cf Delattre, Rights, Responsibilities, and Future Persons, 82 ETHICS 254,
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breaching ancient and sacred obligations, fail to preserve them for
future Greeks to learn from and take pride in. One commentator
expressed these duties frankly:
If we leave an environment to [future generations] that is fit
for pigs they will be like pigs; their tastes will adapt to their condi-
tions .... Suppose we destroyed all of our literary, artistic, and
musical heritage; suppose we left to future generations only pot-
boiler romances, fluorescent velvet paintings, and disco songs.
We would then surely ensure a race of uncultured near-
illiterates.154
Because identification with the past is significantly strengthened by
continued exposure to enduring artifacts, 155 objects as important as
the Marbles (those justifiably considered property for grouphood)
must be retained for the transmission of cultural memory.
Another justification for strict inalienability lies when an item
can be properly characterized as "inherently public property." An-
alyzing beachfront property cases, one commentator discussing this
justificatory theory found that judges relied on three theoretical ba-
ses for decisions: public dedication, custom, and public trust. Pub-
lic dedication deals with the familiar concepts of offer and
acceptance.' 56 Once an owner "offers" a use for the property which
a public "accepts," the property is dedicated. The offer and accept-
ance transform the owner into a fiduciary of the public with respect
to either the dedicated use or the specific portion of the property so
dedicated. Thereafter he may not divert the property to any incon-
sistent uses. A public dedication theory could justify a prohibition
against alienation of the Marbles were they in Greek possession.
Customary rights inhere in property because they predate any
memory to the contrary. According to this theory, communities de-
velop strong emotional attachments to places and things over
256 (1972) ("The meaning of the present depends on the vision of the future as well as
the remembrance of the past.").
154 Sagoff, supra note 135, at 300.
155 See Hardin, Who Cares for Posterity, in RESPONSIBILrrIEs TO FUTURE GENERATIONS
229 (E. Partridge ed. 1981) ("There is considerable anecdotal evidence to show that a
person's identification with the past is significantly strengthened by exposure during
childhood to the sight of enduring artifacts: family portraits, a stable dwelling place,
even unique trees."); Smith, supra note 59, at 87 ("The ways in which people view their
past are to a considerable extent reflected in those objects that they choose to preserve
as reminders of themselves."); cf supra note 88.
156 See Note, Protecting the Public Interest in Art, 91 YALE LJ. 121 (1981) (authored by
Ellen R. Porges) (seeking to apply public dedication theory to the protection of art and
artistic integrity). Hence, unlike a theory of moral rights, see supra note 63, public dedi-
cation of art focuses on protecting the public interest in the artwork itself instead of the
artist's limited rights in the work. While this Note will not focus primarily on thisjustifi-
catory theory, its applicability, as an alternative theory, is nonetheless plausible particu-
larly because a dedication, once founded, cannot be defeated. Id. at 127.
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time. 157 The location of customary public activities matters a great
deal not because the community could not possibly relocate, but be-
cause to do so would spoil the continuity of the community's experi-
ence and diminish the value of the activity itself t1 The long and
continuous use of the Acropolis, and particularly the Parthenon, as a
site of religious practice and pilgrimage, first as pagan temple, then
as church of the Virgin Mary, and finally as an historic monument,
should vest in it customary rights justifying a strict inalienability
rule.
The public trust theory, however, forms the most important
theoretical basis for advocating a regime of strict inalienability. 159
Following basic trust law themes, public trust theory views vested
legal ownership in the unorganized public for the use of the public
at large. 160 The debate over ownership of public lands, and the in-
alienbility of them, is one facet of a larger debate concerning the
legitimacy of collective values-especially those in conflict with indi-
vidualistic values. 161 Perhaps most significant in the evolution and
application of this theory is that both the sovereign and the legisla-
ture have been held powerless to alienate public trust property. 6 2
The status of the entire Acropolis building project as a public work
is wholly consistent with finding a trust reserved in the public. 163 As
suggested earlier, despite unanimous accord of current Greeks,
alienation of the Marbles would necessarily be beyond legislative
control.
157 See Rose, supra note 118, at 759.
158 See id. Such activities "may have value precisely because they reinforce the soli-
darity and fellow-feeling of the whole community; thus the more members of the com-
munity who participate, even if only as observers [to a particular activity], the better for
all." Id. at 767-68.
159 See Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine From Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAvis
L. REV. 185 (1980) (derived from the Roman law idea of res communis, public trust doc-
trine limits alienation of certain properties, thereby preventing the destabilizing disap-
pointment of expectations held in common but without formal recognition such as title).
160 See Rose, supra note 118, at 721.
161 Cf supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
162 For a discussion of such property beyond sovereign control, see, for example,
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 NJ. 306, 318, 471 A.2d 355, 361 (1984)
(quoting Arnold v. Mundy, 6 NJ.L. 1, 87-88 (2d ed. 1875) ("So neither can the king
intrude upon the common property, thus understood, and appropriate to himself, or to
the fiscal purposes of the nation, the enjoyment of it is a natural right which cannot be
infringed or taken away."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
For a discussion of property beyond legislative control, see Rose, supra note 118, at
736 ("but even ... [the legislature] could not grant away trust lands so as to 'divest[] ...
all the citizens of their common right.'" The other side of this theory necessarily as-
sumes that ownership is vested in the people, not the government. Thus, the return of
the Crown of St. Stephen to the Hungarian people, not to its Communist government,
respected the notions of "inherently public property" described above. Cf Dole v.
Carter, 569 F.2d 1109 (10th Cir. 1977).
163 See supra notes 74, 89-92 & 156 and accompanying text.
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A final justification based on fairness grounds remains. Some
foreign museums are so well-endowed that they may outpace cultur-
ally rich, yet economically poor, states bidding on the open market
merely to retain their own cultural patrimony. While a state may
subjectively value certain indigenous cultural property, economic
disproportions and domestic realities could conceivably prevent the
retention of property vital to its grouphood. 164 This scenario may
seem to justify a strict inalienability rule rooted in economic effi-
ciency. Economists, however, technically determine "highest-value
use" objectively. Thus, whoever will pay the most for an item is that
item's highest-value user. 165 Fairness clearly requires a calculus that
measures highest-value use by accounting for ability to pay.
3. Some Historical Examples Consistent with a Theory of Property for
Grouphood
Several historical examples that advocate strict inalienability ap-
pear to rely on either notions of public trust or obligations to future
generations. These examples' intuitive mediation of intergenera-
tionaljustice concerns finds legal expression in something akin to a
perpetually indefeasible life interest with a duty not to commit
waste. A prohibition against transfers which dispossess future re-
maindermen avoids the commission of waste.
In one example, a British diplomat in Paris wrote about the ac-
tivities of Mr. Hamilton, one of Lord Elgin's secretaries who was
primarily responsible for the Marbles' removal:
Mr. Hamilton who is intimate with Canova, the celebrated
artist, expressly sent [to Paris] by the Pope, with a letter to the
King, to reclaim what was taken from Rome [by Napoleon], dis-
164 Cf Crossette, Thais Accuse U.S. in Loss of Temple Art, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1988, at
A9, col. 1. Recent controversy over lost Thai art, see also infra note 173, illustrates the
dilemma for many third world nations. The UNESCO Convention, supra note 3, Art.
7(b)(ii) at 291, allows for the return of cultural property upon payment ofjust compen-
sation. A Thai spokesman said that his country had not signed the Convention "because
it could not agree-and could not afford-to pay for art objects it believed were right-
fully Thai." Id. Cf Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324,
337, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977) (city's landmark preservation
regulation prohibiting construction of office building atop terminal is constitutional),
aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978): "In times of easy affluence, preservation of historic
landmarks through use of the eminent domain power might be desirable, or even re-
quired. But when a less expensive alternative is available, especially when a city is in
financial distress, it should not be forced to choose between witnessing the demolition
of its glorious past and mortgaging its hopes for the future." Id. at 922.
165 This sort of counterintuitive treatment by the law and economics school has en-
gendered some criticism. See, e.g., Ungar, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 561, 574-78 (1983) (suggesting that the law and economics literature frequently
fails to recognize that economic analyses often depend on the nature of the existing
institutional structure, and thus do not have universal validity).
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tinctly ascertained from [Canova] that the Pope, if successful [in
his attempt to retake the papal art], neither could nor would as
Pope sell any of the chefs d'oeuvres that belonged to the See, and in
which he has, in fact, only a life interest.166
The next example also acknowledges the intuitive appeal of the
life interest model. It also identifies with the concept of intergener-
ational ownership. While constructing the Panama Canal, a high of-
ficial sought to purchase nearby sand, to use in construction. The
reigning Indian cacique replied: "'He who made this sand made it
for the Cuna Cuna who live no longer, for those who are here today
and also for those to come. So it is not ours only, and we could not
sell it.' "167
In addition, application of the Roman law usufruct, which essen-
tially gives one the right to use and take the fruits and profits of
another's property without altering its character, is instructive.
168
This very notion implicitly underlies many early conventions on the
acquisition of property during wartime. The Lieber Code, which set
the ground rules of property appropriation during the American
Civil War, first relied on usufructuary principles. 169 The Brussels
Draft of 1874, which heralded both the 1899 and 1907 Hague Con-
ventions on cultural property relied heavily on Lieber, and conse-
quently on the usufructuary principle. 170 Each of these conventions
established, as its leading achievement, that an occupying state had
only a usufructuary interest in the property of the conquered state
by right of the occupancy.
This same reasoning apparently underlies section two of the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978.171 Through this
Act, the government asserted its authority to preserve traditional In-
dian religions by assuring at least the use and possession of sacred
objects. The Act's guidelines, therefore, actually provide that sa-
cred objects alienated from tribes, contrary to tribal standards, be
returned upon request when needed for use.
172
166 C. HITCHENS, supra note 2, at 56. "[Hamilton] seemed quite unaware of the hy-
pocrisy implicit in his view, . . . 'that these works are considered so sacred a property,
that no direct or indirect means are to be allowed for their being conveyed elsewhere
than where they came from.'" Id.
Thus, Hitchens implies that Hamilton never considered that the Marbles might be
as sacred to the Greeks as the papal art was to Catholics.
167 S. MORISON, ADMIRAL OF THE OCEAN SEA: A LIFE OF CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS
635 (1942).
168 B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAw 144 (1962).
169 Tay, supra note 99, at 121.
170 Id. at 122.
171 Partially codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982). See Echo-Hawk, supra note 53, at
439.
172 See Echo-Hawk, supra note 53, at 452 (quoting Journeycake v. Cherokee, 28 Ct. Cl.
281 (1893), aft'd, 155 U.S. 196 (1894)).
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These examples are at least consistent, in spirit, with the pro-
tection of grouphood property advocated in this Note. They each
appear to understand that the propinquity between object and cul-
ture is worth protecting. Moreover, they also appear to acknowl-
edge that the only adequate means of protecting future generations'
rights as prospective group members is by the imposition of abso-
lute restraints on alienability.
III
RECONCILING CULTURAL INTERNATIONALISM WITH
PROPERTY FOR GROUPHOOD
Over the past several decades, two major conventions have
aimed at protecting cultural property: the 1954 Hague Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict and the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibit-
ing and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property. While the Hague Convention's
emphasis on cultural universalism has been nominally replaced by
the UNESCO Convention's focus on group or nation rights, a di-
chotomy still persists in thinking about cultural property. 173
Many justifications for retaining improperly alienated cultural
property find expression in facially reasonable epithets referring to
certain property as belonging to the "common heritage of man-
kind." Many of the nations responsible for works claimed to be of
global import are artistically rich, yet economically impoverished.
As a result, universalist claims often conspire with economic reali-
173 For a detailed discussion of these two approaches to cultural property, see Mer-
ryman, supra note 1, at 845-49. Evidence of this dichotomy has emerged recently in the
form of an open letter concerning lost Thai art. Appearing in prominent Thai newspa-
pers the sponsors wrote: "The American Government facilitated the robbery of cultural
treasures in this region through the use of special rights [during the Vietnam years]."
See Crossette, supra note 164, at A9, col. 1. The letter ends with an appeal "to our
friends, the American people, to bring pressure to bear so that this cultural treasure
[10th-13th century stone lintel carved with an image entitled 'Vishnu Sleeping on the
Water' displayed at the Art Institute of Chicago] may be returned to us." Id Confusion
about the status of such property is manifest in the statement of a Thai official heading
the movement for the lintel's return: "I want to make the point that this art does not
belong only to the Thai people but to all the world .... But it should go where it
belongs." Id. Under this Note's analysis, if the art sought by the Thais fulfilled the
requirements for grouphood property, the Thais should have sole claim to it; then, the
spokesman's characterization of the lintel as globally-owned becomes mere hyperbole.
If, however, the lintel failed a grouphood property test, then the Thais would have no
claim if the art was voluntarily transferred. Their rights would have been adequately
protected by a mere "property rule" instead of an "inalienability rule." Of course, if the
art were stolen, some remedies might still exist. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 3
at 290; CPIA, supra note 3. See also National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315
(1982); 66 AM.JUR. 2D Replevin § 2 (1973) (replevin action allows for recovery of specific
chattel detained or taken).
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ties to deprive such nations of their special wealth. 174 These na-
tions, as heirs to cultural patrimony, have strong equitable claims to
their ancestral property for the reasons given throughout this Note.
Yet, when the international communitya-usually in the form of
economically powerful nations and museums-retains alienated art,
it may do so in the hope of promoting intercultural understanding.
For example, some of these museums often can provide optimal ex-
posure for such art.1 75 Reconciling the opposing interests of ances-
tral heirs to cultural property with those universalist interests of the
international community is an unhappy chore. Each reconciliation
should be made according to its own facts, guided by the few neutral
principles developed below. Once again, this Note will examine
these principles as hypothetically applied to the Parthenon Marbles.
One commentator has set out three conditions which might jus-
tify foreign possessors retaining alienated cultural property. 176
First, retention might be permissible where the group that created
the art no longer survives as a people. 177 However, the rejection of
the Fallmerayer theory and the continuity of the Greek community
moot this justification in the case of the Parthenon Marbles.' 78 Sec-
ond, retention may be warranted if present descendants carelessly
preserve antiquities of international importance. 179 The sophistica-
tion of Greek archaeological and preservation techniques, however,
defeats this rationalization. 180 Third, the existence of particular
174 "Art historians, archaeologists, anthropologists and others who make universal-
ist claims can and do destroy the traditions of technologically weaker societies. The
traditional history of one society is thus absorbed into the universal heritage of the more
powerful society." Smith, Art Objects and Historical Usage, in WHo OWNS THE PAST, supra
note 59, at 83.
175 Cf Holm, supra note 94 (describing the Marbles' arrival in London as effecting a
"complete revolution in [the British] conception of ancient art.").
176 See C. HrrCHENS, supra note 2, at 80 (quoting Colin Maclnnes, a writer who in the
1960's concerned himself with the Marbles).
177 The Babylonians are an example.
178 See supra note 62 for a rejection of the Fallmerayer theory.
179 Whether or not this justification is strong enough to trump concerns for in-
tergenerational justice must be resolved according to the facts of each case. While the
group rights of unascertained remaindermen seem unassailable, especially egregious ne-
glect by groups of their cultural property could warrant limited intervention, well-tai-
lored to minimize any potential affront to grouphood. If property were to be taken
under such circumstances, it should be held in trust until the group could adequately
care for the property. Cf supra note 82 (parliamentary dissenters from the purchase of
the Marbles from Elgin suggested as an amendment that the Marbles be held in trust for
an independent Greece).
180 M. ANDRONICOS, supra note 2, at 9 ("The Greeks of today watch over these un-
earthed treasures with the greatest of care, not only for their own benefit, but for all
those who travel from every country to contemplate the beauty of an art that once filled
this small comer of the world with a unique radiance."). The Greeks built a nitrogen
air-conditioning hall in Athens where other Greek art receives shelter from corrosive
elements. Many other steps have been undertaken to assure the Marbles' safety if they
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items of cultural property in profusion in the source nation may
merit foreign retention.181 Indeed, a source nation seeking to hoard
art that is fully replicated in its own collections might violate prop-
erty for grouphood's prohibition against bad object relations, in
which case an inalienability rule should no longer apply.
Some clever retentionists argue that Greece can scarcely be
considered culturally impoverished.18 2 This, however, confuses the
issue. This Note's analysis is not concerned with the aggregate
amount of art possessed by a source group; rather, it is concerned
with the amount of a specific type of art possessed by the group.
Because the Marbles are irreplaceable pieces belonging to a larger
structural entity, their absence arouses universal feelings of aliena-
tion among Greeks precisely because they are bound up in Greek
grouphood.18 3 As the Marbles are an unreplicated, unique example
of the apex of classical sculpture and stonework, strict inalienability
of the Marbles does not constitute bad object relations.
Most would agree that hoarding is fetishistic and that it consti-
tutes bad object relations. A source nation's retention of works al-
ready adequately restrained and protected from alienation
constitutes hoarding.'8 4 While such practices may not harm the
are returned. See E. VRANOPOULOS, THE PARTHENON AND THE ELGIN MARBLES 31 (1985).
Additionally, to preserve the monuments from the effects of pollution, the government
has implemented an alternative-day driving rule in Athens. It has also taken care to
route all air traffic patterns away from the Acropolis. Id.
181 See supra note 41.
182 See Merryman, supra note 1, at 832. See also Merryman, supra note 82, at 1920-21
("If all the works of the great artists of classical Athens were returned to and kept there,
the rest of the world would be culturally impoverished.").
183 Indeed, Nobel Laureate Odysseus Elytis confirmed this when he said: "When I
saw the Marbles at the British Museum, although without fanatical nationalist sentiment,
I had a feeling of desolation.., as if one saw someone in exile." See C. HITCHENs, supra
note 2, at 82; supra notes 26-82 and accompanying text.
184 In a press report, Professor Merryman emphasized that the importance of art to
the international community should be considered before an importing nation accedes
to enforcing restrictive local export laws. He asked rhetorically, "why should the rest of
the world honor [a state's] policy of hoarding artifacts? Only objects central to a culture,
like the Liberty Bell, should have constraints on their sale." Gerson, Who Owns Artifacts?
International Art Trade Spurs Legal Discussions, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27, 1987, at 9, col. 1. This
Note does not quarrel with this latter position. Indeed, Merryman seems intuitively to
reach similar conclusions as this Note by using the example of the Liberty Bell, which
would assuredly, like the Parthenon Marbles, qualify as grouphood property.
Merryman develops his own test in later writing, however, which may not be recon-
cilable with his current characterization of the Liberty Bell asjustifiedly restrainable. See
Merryman, supra note 5, at 497. In this test, Merryman would allow a strict inalienability
approach only if (1) the creating culture were still alive; and (2) if the object were ac-
tively employed in religious, ceremonial, or communal activities. Under his test the Afo-
A-Kom, Cameroonian tribal art repatriated because of its propinquity to the Kom peo-
ple, was properly returned. See F. FERRETrI, AFo-A-KoM: SACRED ART OF CAMEROON
(1975); J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAw, supra note 66, at 56-58. The resolution of the
Afo-A-Kom controversy is remarkably consistent with this Note's group rights analysis.
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work itself, they ignore the role of cultural property as an ambassa-
dor.18 5 The hoarding impulse may breed a racial and ethnic intoler-
ance that is inimical to the promotion of intercultural flourishing. 1
86
That is precisely why this Note's analysis would refuse to accord
special protections to an object whose retention constitutes bad ob-
ject relations.
Sharing art can produce artistic and intellectual cross-fertiliza-
tion and stimulation that will promote human, communal, and inter-
cultural flourishing. It can enrich the intellectual and artistic life of
another state. 187 Hoarding interferes with these desirable out-
The government of Cameroon, which was interested in diluting tribal loyalities in com-
petition with its national authority, insisted upon the return of the statute to it. Instead,
however, the Afo-A-Kom was ultimately restored at the Kom royal palace in the high-
lands of Cameroon, much to Merryman's approval.
Yet according to Merryman, who has made similar Greek requests for repatriation
of the Parthenon Marbles a subject of his academic career, Greek attempts are steeped
in what he derides as "Byronism." Merryman's Byronism is primarily an appeal to the
emotions and, as such it "divert[s] attention from the facts and discourage[s] reasoned
discussion of the issues." Merryman, supra note 5, at 495. It is the "romantic attribution
of national character to cultural objects, with the corollary that they belonig in national
territory." Id. On one hand, Merryman finds former Minister Mercouri's characteriza-
tion of the Marbles as a "monument to Greek identity, part of our deepest consciousness
of the Greek people: our roots, our continuity, our soul," see supra note 83, to exemplify
Byronism and, implicitly, thus not to justify repatriation. Yet, in response to a Camer-
oonian diplomat's similar description of the Afo-A-Kom statue as "the heart of the Kom,
what unifies the tribe, the spirit of the nation, what holds us together," see I J. MERRYMAN
& A. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 2-2 (1979), Merryman lauds this plea as a
compelling and eloquent justification for the statue's return to the Kom people. Only
result-oriented reasoning could justify the Afo-A-Kom's repatriation, yet condemn the
Marbles' repatriation.
Nonetheless, even Merryman's own test would justify the repatriation of the Mar-
bles. They would be employed precisely in the communal fashion Pericles intended in
dedicating them: to impel Greeks to greater achievements and to foster national pride.
Cf Thucydides, supra note 89, at 148.
Merryman's preoccupation with "invidious nationalism," "covetous neglect," and
"destructive retention" is addressed by the second prong of this Note's property for
grouphood test which would refuse to protect articles whose retention constitutes bad
object relations. Further, this Note's analysis answers Merryman's concern for measur-
ing an object's propinquity by assuring that property for grouphood be bound up with
group identity. Hence, just as the Afo-A-Kom's absence "left a cultural lacuna that
could only be filled by its return," see Merryman, supra note 5, at 497, the removal of the
Parthenon Marbles must have likewise left a void in Greek cultural identity. Any analy-
sis that purports to distinguish between these cases can only be grounded upon risky
substantive judgments about the value of an object to one culture as opposed to the
value of another object to a different culture.
185 Bator, supra note 5, at 306. "Countries that allow their art to spread abroad
derive both obvious and subtle advantages. Art is a good ambassador. It stimulates
interest in, understanding of, and sympathy and admiration for that country." Id.
186 Intercultural flourishing is plainly an analogue to both human and communal
flourishing. Intercultural flourishing envisions cooperation, sharing, and understanding
among nations.
187 See supra notes 94, 171-81 and accompanying text.
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comes. Nonetheless, absent a showing of bad object relations, such
goals, must not trump the aims of property for grouphood.
Once again, in the personhood setting, a regime of mere mar-
ket-inalienability applies to property for personhood. Gifts are al-
lowed as consistent with the goals of human flourishing. While
market-inalienability inadequately protects property for grouphood
because it allows for dispossession, sharing with other nations or
groups cultural property that does not fall within the narrow scope
of property for grouphood is consistent with intercultural flourish-
ing, and thus, should be encouraged.
Three recurring assumptions about property for grouphood
persist, however, and must be accounted for before striking an effec-
tive reconciliation between the impulses of cultural universalism and
cultural nationalism (group rights). First, many believe that cultural
property belongs to everyone. Second, many have argued that the
sharing of art promotes international understanding and tolerance.
Third, despite universalist sentiments, there is an "assumption that
any [group] may be placed at a disadvantage if its cultural property
has been dispersed, so that it is unable to promote its own cultural
identity through [the art's] exhibition."188 Thus, national identity is
still desirable and must be fostered.189
Reconciliation of the contraposed values of cultural universal-
ism and group rights should be forged in a category of property
which promotes universalist goals without disadvantaging the
grouphood aims of communal flourishing. Art that would fail the
second prong of the property for grouphood test because its reten-
tion is fetishistic fits such a category. As explained, it is unduly fe-
tishistic to retain duplicates of objects already adequately restrained.
Many great works-those existing in profusion-do not deserve the
level of protection afforded by a strict inalienability rule. Moreover,
when such pieces exist in profusion, their marginal utility is dimin-
ished.1 90 The 3001st Etruscan vase, for example, will play a negligi-
ble role in achieving the ends to which property for grouphood
aspires.
Even objects whose retention would be permissible under a
188 Mulvaney, A Question of Values: Museums and Cultural Property, in WHO OWNs THE
PAST?, supra note 2, at 90.
189 Compare Merryman, supra note 5, at 510 ("It is clearly right for a nation to retain
important works of indigenous cultures") (emphasis supplied), with Mulvaney, supra note
188, at 96 (finding much of the retention impulse steeped in "invidious nationalism"
and "xenophobia.").
190 UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the International Exchange of Cultural
Property, UNESCO Doc. IV.B.8. (Nov. 26, 1976) (sanctioning the release of works of
minor or secondary importance, "because of their plurality, as "valuable accessions" by
other countries).
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strict property for grouphood analysis may sometimes promote the
aims of cultural universalism without unduly disadvantaging
grouphood and its corresponding aim of communal flourishing.
This could be achieved by vesting and maintaining ownership of the
object in the source nation, yet encouraging the possessor to lend
out the work on short term bases through international
exhibitions. 191
The unique stature of the Parthenon Marbles as the pinnacle of
the most renowned period of Greek artistic genius, their aesthetic
inseparability from the rest of the Parthenon, and their psychic im-
portance to Greeks, make the Marbles an exceptional example of
property for grouphood. The Marbles cannot be duplicated, just as
the original Declaration of Independence, Liberty Bell, or Statue of
Liberty cannot be duplicated. That the Greeks possess other works
created by the artisans who labored on the Acropolis project is no
rejoinder. This suggestion misconceives what qualifies as a dupli-
cate. The determination of what constitutes hoarding will surely
turn on the existence of similar art in abundance and will be a vex-
ing issue in many cases. In this Note's example, however, such a
determination is easily made. Because they are bound up with
Greek identity and because their retention would not constitute bad
object relations, the Parthenon Marbles are property for
grouphood.
CONCLUSION
Property for grouphood should be recognized as a new classifi-
cation of property rights enforced through a regime of strict inalien-
ability. Accepting that groups have rights, and that those rights are
not subservient to, but equal to individual rights, such rights may
logically inhere in cultural property. Thus, when property is bound
up with the holder's identity, and its retention does not represent
bad object relations, it qualifies as property for grouphood.
Only a strict inalienability rule sufficiently protects rights in
grouphood property. Market-inalienability-the mere prohibition
of sales but not gifts-incompletely protects the grouphood right in
property, despite its adequate protection of analogous personhood
rights in property. While market-inalienability seeks merely to pre-
191 This, of course, depends upon the gratuity of the source nations. In a world of
private ordering, it should not be difficult to effect such goals. The frequency of interna-
tional art exhibitions attests to this. I do emphasize, however, the short-term nature of
these loans. Otherwise, the same concerns about dispossession loom largely. For exam-
ple, a loan of property for grouphood to a foreign museum for an excessive term may
unduly deprive a generation of group members of their inalienable interests. Thus,
however powerful private ordering is on either side, it must always fall short of overturn-
ing a determination of strict inalienability.
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vent the use of market rhetoric to describe personhood property, in
the grouphood context all transfers must be prohibited to prevent
dispossession.
Both efficiency and distributional concerns support imposition
of a strict inalienability regime to protect group rights. As well, con-
cern for intergenerational justice plays a decisive role in this Note's
treatment of the Parthenon Marbles. Because all members of the
Greek group-past, present, and future-have rights to their com-
mon heritage, no present generation should be permitted to commit
future members to an artistically-barren existence by alienating the
group's cultural memory.
While some writers have undertaken to discuss more technical
issues relating to the Parthenon Marbles, this Note has used the
Marbles as a paradigmatic case of cultural property which, by fulfil-
ling grouphood property criteria, warrants inalienability. This Note
does not explicitly advocate the return of the Marbles; instead, it
discovers a collision course, plotted long ago, respecting two very
different ways of thinking about cultural property. It adapts from
old usages a notion of property for grouphood which can be used
both to reconcile these opposing tensions and to help decide among
rival claimants their entitlements to cultural property. Hence, this
Note merely posits an alternative vision of rights in cultural prop-
erty in general, rather than establishing specific mechanisms for ad-
judicating claims. This Note finds strong theoretical and practical
reasons for removing property for grouphood from the bustle of the
marketplace. Our most vibrant conception of communal flourish-
ing, and how best to effectuate it, rather than notions of moving
cultural property to the locus of highest-value use, should instead
guide our consciences in making decisions about the disposition of
culture and identity inherent in any transfer of property for
grouphood.
John Moustakas
19891 1227
